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Abstract
Structural Health Monitoring (SHM) systems face many obstacles and gaps that
have resulted in the slow implementation in real-world applications. These obstacles
include technology performance, implementation issues and a solid business case that
justifies the investment in a SHM system. The presentation of a solid business case for
the SHM system is a great challenge and arguably is the main factor contributing to the
slow implementation of this technology. The research intent of this dissertation is to
focus on the business case by providing a tool to aid decision makers. Simulated aging
aircraft flight data are used in this effort due to the fact that many aging military aircraft
will be flying beyond their initially intended design life. An analytical model was
developed to address the business case and the integration of the SHM system into
Condition Based Maintenance (CBM). The model aids the calculation of the cost of Life
Cycle (LC) events resulting from the implementation of the SHM system on an aging
aircraft. In addition, the model captures the events and effect on aircraft availability due
to different SHM detection threshold settings and replacement of degraded sensors. The
model captures false alarm rates, crack growth, probability of detection, and sensor
degradation amongst other parameters. The proposed analytical model is a useful tool
that provides the decision makers the confidence to either implement the SHM system on
an aging military aircraft or not. Two models were developed; one was the SHM system
model with no degradation and the second was the SHM system model with simulated
degrading sensors. Three major subcomponents of the SHM model will be the sensor
detection component, the crack growth component and the sensor degradation component
(second model only). Linking these three components where the main parameters of
interest (crack length, sensor degradation/detection) are not static and accounting for

iv

senor replacement will provide useful data of LC cost estimation that have not been
accomplished before.
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STRUCTURAL HEALTH MONITORING SYSTEM TRADE SPACE ANALYSIS
TOOL WITH CONSIDERATION FOR CRACK GROWTH, SENSOR
DEGRADATION AND A VARIABLE DETECTION THRESHOLD

I. Introduction
Motivation
Aircraft (Structural Health Monitoring) SHM is a research area that will lead to a
major change in the way we manage the health of our fleet in the future. Relatively few
SHM systems are in operation on aircraft today. A review and a gap analysis of some of
the relevant SHM literature led us to identify the current challenges facing the
implementation of an SHM system. Some of the main SHM system’s challenges are the
technology performance, implementation issues and a solid business case. The
presentation of a solid business case for such a system is considered very important as
this challenge has a great impact on the decision to implement an SHM on an operational
aircraft.
A perspective of the structural mechanics program of the Air Force Office of
Scientific Research on structural health monitoring (SHM) and non-destructive
evaluation (NDE) was presented by (Giurgiutiu, 2008). NDE and SHM have an essential
role in the operational readiness and safety of the Air Force fleet; however, considerable
challenges face the operators and the maintainers due to aging aircraft. NDE techniques
have proven to be reliable in detecting damage during phase inspections. SHM has great
potential due to its on board sensors and systems that provide structural health assessment
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on demand. This study concludes that considerable applied and fundamental research is
needed to develop, integrate and implement SHM technology.
Research Problem Statement
Develop a decision support model to explore the tradespace associated with
implementation of an SHM system on aging aircraft.
Features of the model should include:
•

Capture representative crack propagation with respect to accumulated flight
hours;

•

Capture representative performance of SHM sensors as influenced by SHM
detection thresholds and acceptable crack lengths;

•

Capture representative change in detection of SHM sensors due to degradation as
a result of accumulated flight hours;

•

Capture representative events and aircraft unavailability encountered due to
sensor maintenance/replacement during SHM system scheduled and unscheduled
maintenance;

•

Capture representative events and aircraft unavailability encountered due to
aircraft scheduled and unscheduled maintenance associated with SHM alarm
verification inspection and inspect/repair of aircraft;

•

Capture catastrophic failure events due to miss detection and a crack reaching the
critical length.

Assumptions and limitations of this model are as follows:
•

The SHM system monitors a hot spot on an aging military aircraft;
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•

Initially a single hot spot will be assumed; while not demonstrated in this
research, the approach herein is readily extensible to monitoring multiple hot
spots;

•

Degradation of sensors is due to loads exerted due to flight maneuvers;

•

While the model will capture event data, for purposes of this research notional
event parameters will be utilized;

•

While maintenance events are captured by the model, a cost per event is not
assumed or modeled.

The model can be utilized for informing decisions associated with implementation
of an SHM system on aging aircraft. This will be attained through the more realistic
modeling of crack growth, sensor detection/degradation, cost and SHM system
maintenance procedures associated with a particular aircraft.
The outline of the dissertation is as follows: Chapter II will discuss the current
state of aircraft SHM research and will build the case for what is proposed through this
research effort. This is accomplished by identifying the gaps in previous SHM studies
and will help support why this research effort is needed. Chapter III is a journal article
demonstrating a trade space analysis of an aircraft equipped with a SHM system. This
trade space analysis considers the effect of setting the SHM system detection threshold
on the LC events. Chapter IV is a journal article that demonstrates the effect of the SHM
system sensor degradation on the LC events that an aircraft might encounter. Chapter V
discusses results, conclusions, future work and recommendations.
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II. Literature Review
Technology Performance
Much research in the field of structural health monitoring (SHM) for aircraft has
been conducted with performance objectives of reduced life cycle cost and increased
availability. Yet there are still gaps that slow the implementation of SHM systems. The
performance of SHM technology has been and is still being investigated. Many believe
that available technology did not reach the maturity level for what we want to
accomplish. In research on SHM by (Derriso et al., 2007) technical feasibility is
described as facing three fundamental challenges: 1) small-scale damage must be
detected in relatively large-scale structures, 2) SHM systems must work in an
unsupervised learning mode, and 3) the redundancy and robustness of a SHM system
must be reliable. Reliability and durability are a major technological concern for SHM
systems.
Reliability
False alarms that could be produced from the SHM system cause more
maintenance actions than are necessary. A simulation model of a prognostics and health
management (PHM) system used as an autonomic logistics system (ALS) for the joint
strike fighter (JSF) was developed and used by (Miller et al., 2007). Their simulation
captured a large number of commonly used flight line measures of performance for
aircraft availability and mission effectiveness. Multivariate statistical analysis of these
measures provided ways to analyze the positive impact of a PHM system on aircraft
sortie generation. On the other hand, their analysis showed a great sensitivity to false
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alarms. This great sensitivity implies that more research effort should be devoted to
investigating and trying to minimize false alarms which cause’s excessive downtime and
cost without significantly degrading detection performance.
Another experiment was conducted on a fast military jet by (Read et al., 2008) to
try to test a SHM system in near real-world applications. A BAE Hawk jet carrying an
experimental test pod with specimens that had crack initiators was used to test the effect
of flight maneuvers on the SHM system detection capability and the possibility of
detecting crack growth during flight. The conclusion was that this system was effective in
detecting a crack and the growth of the crack during flight especially if false alarms can
be avoided. The tests were run throughout the flight envelope in the presence of acoustic
noise levels in excess of 135 decibels and considerable electromagnetic interference.
With this experiment, one still can argue that the system was not attached to a real
structure.
Many reliability models are developed in the general area of structural
monitoring. For example, a Reliability-Based System Assessment was used by Hosser et
al. (2004) for monitoring building structures with sensors.
For reasons of economy, structural monitoring currently has to be concentrated on
the weak spots critical for the structural behavior and the corresponding uncertainties. In
order to accomplish this, methods for the identification of such weak points and
uncertainties are used for the definition of optimal monitoring measures as well as
assessment and decision criteria. These methods are based on recognized procedures of
reliability and system theory.
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In order to make the application possible to building engineers without special
training in reliability theory, the methods were summarized in the knowledge-based
system PROBILAS (PRObabilistic Building Inspection and Life ASsessment). This
computer code consists of a data base module, a computation module and a statistics and
updating module, which are linked by graphical user interface and server for the
optimization of the building assessment cycle. An essential component of the assessment
is the illustration of the building as a system and its integration into the data base and the
computation module of PROBILAS. Since the logical models of real structures, e.g.
bridges, needed as elements of the system reliability computation can be very complex,
methods are developed to identify and integrate the possible failure mechanisms. In their
article, the building assessment cycle with the knowledge-based system PROBILAS is
illustrated first. The continuous reevaluation of the system and the focusing of both the
stochastic and the physical models on the failure-relevant parts of the system, limit states
and parameters are characteristics of this cycle. A main focus of this article is on the
methods of system integration. Some steps of the system generation run more or less
automatically, e.g. the creation of response surfaces for the limit-state functions of system
components. In other domains the monitoring engineer is consciously involved in the
process while PROBILAS offers the necessary assessment and decision criteria. The
different methods are described and demonstrated using an example of a bridge
construction.
The large amount of data produced from monitoring needs improved statistical
tools to clearly identify defects. A synopsis review conducted by (Sohn and Los Alamos
National Laboratory, 2004) identified that in general there is not yet tools that are well
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developed and implemented for statistical pattern recognition. Many damage detection
methods try to identify damage by solving an inverse problem, which requires the
construction of analytical models. An inverse problem can be described as a general
framework that is used to convert observed measurements (i.e., monitoring data) into
information about a physical object or system (i.e., defect) of interest. A neural network
approach can be used to map the inverse relationship between the parameter of interest
and the measured response. The main drawback for this approach is that a large amount
of data is needed for the damaged and undamaged component and this is not available in
the real world (Sohn and Los Alamos National Laboratory, 2004). Analysis of hypotheses
approaches includes outlier analysis, statistical process control charts and simple
hypothesis testing as indicated by this review. These approaches are demonstrated to be
very effective for identifying the onset of damage growth, and they are identified as one
of the most significant improvements (Sohn and Los Alamos National Laboratory, 2004).
Durability and Robustness
Many studies show degradation of SHM sensors over time due to static loads,
cyclic loads, temperature and corrosion. Durability and robustness are additional
technology performance issues for an SHM system.
An investigation on the effect of cyclic loads on sensor performance was
conducted by Kuhn (2009) which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter III. In his
research, degradation was identified in sensor performance as having a direct relationship
with cyclic strain which was estimated by using a power law model. A probability of
detection (POD) degradation model was also developed to show the overall performance
of a SHM system. Research by Achenbach (2007) indicated that some of the technical
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challenges for sensors are that they should be small, autonomous, cheap, robust,
repairable, accurate, densely distributed, measure local and system level responses, and
designed to measure relevant damage parameters. Beard et al. (2005) found that
environmental conditions such as temperature can affect the signal obtained from sensors.
This research used calibration to compensate for temperature variation based on the
structure and application. A sensor diagnostics and validation process was presented by
Park et al. (2006). It performs in situ monitoring of the operational status of a
piezoelectric (PZT) active-sensor in SHM applications. Both degradation of the
mechanical/electrical properties of a PZT transducer and the bonding defects between a
PZT patch and a host structure could be identified by the proposed process in Park et al.
(2006). The proposed process can provide a metric that can be used to determine the
sensor functionality over a long period of service time or after an extreme loading event.
More research is needed to understand all environmental factors that could degrade the
sensing of an SHM system such as corrosion. Moreover, the maintenance action needed
to bring the degraded SHM system back to its original condition needs to be investigated.
Implementation Issues
Design of an SHM system should be part of a system engineering framework that
integrates health monitoring and maintenance with all other requirements for the system.
For a new aircraft design, this would begin with the conceptual design of the system and
would affect decisions regarding levels of maintenance and inspection intervals, among
others. Less extensive implementations are being proposed for aging aircraft. A
framework for SHM system design was presented which could be applied to aging
aircraft through hot spot monitoring (Malkin et al., 2007). Understanding the structure of
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interest and establishing requirements could start the framework flow. This flow ends
with comparing requirements to specific SHM system designs. The data needed from an
identified requirement for an SHM system can be obtained by focusing on the following
points: 1) benefits and drawbacks of the SHM system, 2) requirements for the SHM
system, 3) available SHM technologies, 4) detail design of the SHM systems, and 5)
identifying the SHM design that meets the requirements and the cost of the SHM system
that meets the requirements. Although this framework is developed for hot spot
monitoring it could be modified for other applications. It would be useful if this
framework could be modified to include the effect of sensor degradation.
Research by Millar (2007) identifies that the barriers that have slowed acceptance
and use of PHM tools in military propulsion systems over the past two decades were the
product of incomplete total life cycle systems engineering management (TLCSM). The
US Department of Defense Acquisition Guidebook states in Section 4.1.3 TLCSM in
Systems Engineering: “It is fundamental to systems engineering to take a total life cycle,
total systems approach to system planning, development, and implementation.” (Defense
Acquisition Guidebook, 2004:Ch 4, 80). It is also important to implement TLCSM not
only on new systems but also on legacy systems currently operating to control the high
maintenance cost as the systems continue to operate beyond their design life. Further, the
research describes up and down periods in the engine condition monitoring which are
time phases. The up periods are triggered by the cost benefits that could be gained by
successful monitoring and the down period is when the demanded monitoring technology
is not available for the monitoring system. This study concludes that using TLCSM
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through the systems engineering process is the right tool to close the gaps that held the
large scale applications and implementation of integrated monitoring systems.
Advanced integrated vehicle health monitoring systems (IVHM) are expected to
formulate a decision response based on the extent of the damage unlike a pure monitoring
system that only reports damage (Price et al., 2003). Price et al. sub-divided the problem
to achieve the requirements of this system as follows: 1) Detection of damage events
requires some knowledge of the environment in which the vehicle will operate and
threats it will face, 2) The development of sensors will depend on the time required for
the system to respond, 3) For events requiring a rapid response the use of passive
embedded sensors is the best solution, 4) Characterization of damage may be
accomplished during detection of damage or separately by using different sensors or
using a sensor in different ways, 5) Active sensors could be employed to accomplish
characterization of damage by being embedded in the structure, 6) Prioritization of the
seriousness of damage and how it can compromise the mission of the vehicle is needed to
give the level of urgency to the response, 7) Identification of the cause of the damage can
be accomplished using an intelligent system, 8) Large number of sensors can provide
information on the vehicle as a whole, 9) Formulation of a response of an intelligent
system is dependent on the extent of the damage and could be a panic response for major
damage requiring the isolation of a whole section of the vehicle, 10) Execution of a
response could be a maintenance action or could be a more immediate action of limiting
the flight maneuvers of the vehicle. This approach will be hard to implement on an aging
aircraft where embedding sensors on the existing structure might be hard or infeasible.
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The integration process of SHM on aging aircraft is a challenge. In the near
future, an SHM system could be integrated on aging aircraft to monitor known failure
modes as a starting step in the integration process. Aging aircraft face challenges on how
to integrate an SHM system with Condition Based Maintenance (CBM) because design
choices are limited by the existing system architecture. A number of integration issues
were researched by Buderath (2004) and concluded the following: 1) There should be a
clear process for integration to ensure the right selection of an SHM system, data
analysis, and sensor location, 2) Integration technology should be researched in order to
reach acceptance on all system levels, 3) An integrated process is needed during the
development phase of an SHM system to be able to fully integrate with CBM, 4)
Research should be extended to include the integration technologies, 5) When a
successful SHM system and CBM integration is achieved we can improve safety and
trigger maintenance action only when needed.
Business Case
The presentation of a solid business case for the SHM system is a great challenge
and arguably is the main factor contributing to the slow implementation of this
technology. Factors that could help create a business case are the understanding of the
customer needs and requirements and performing a credible cost and risk analysis (Perez
et al., 2010).
Quantifying cost reduction
Quantification of cost reduction in the total life cycle of a system by using SHM
needs to be presented. There are few research attempts to quantify the cost benefit of
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SHM found in literature. In one study, implementation of SHM on a commercial
transport aircraft could result in an estimated 30% to 40% reduction in maintenance
requirements. This would result in a recovery of the initial implementation costs in only
two to three years (Kent et al., 2000). Another research effort (Schmidt et al., 2004)
shows only a one percent reduction of the maintenance by using SHM systems on an
AIRBUS aircraft, but it did not include the increased availability due to reduced
inspection times. Another finding of this study is a reduced panel weight up to 15 percent
by using SHM which impacts cost in many ways such as less fuel consumption and
longer operating range. In the case of reusable launch vehicles a study has shown that the
benefits of implementing a SHM system outweigh the cost (Derriso et al., 2007). Further,
research on aging military aircraft show cost benefits of using SHM on some hot spots of
the structure of a Tornado fighter as long as the hot spots with real payoff are identified
(Boller, 2001).
Systems level cost model
A unique cost-benefit analysis for the allocation and cost justification of an
Integrated System Health Management (ISHM) at the conceptual design level was
presented by Hoyle et al. (2007). An optimization framework was used to determine the
optimal allocation of ISHM to maximize profit. This was calculated using the following
profit function (Π):

𝑀+𝑁
Π = 𝐴𝑆 ∙ 𝑅 − 𝐶 = ∏𝑖=1
𝐴𝐹,𝑖 ∙ 𝑅 − ∑𝑁
𝑖=1(𝐶𝑅 + 𝐶𝐷 )𝑖
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(1)

The objective function, referred to as Profit, Π, is expressed as the product of
System Availability (𝐴𝑆 ) and Revenue per unit Availability (R), minus Cost (C), which is

a summation of Cost of Detection (𝐶𝐷 ) and Cost of Risk (𝐶𝑅 ) over the total number of
system functions N. The system availability is determined as the product of the

availabilities of the N system functions and the M allocated ISHM sensor suites; the
models function availability will differ for functions with and without ISHM. This
framework can also determine the optimal detection/false alarm threshold and inspection
interval. When this framework was applied to an aerospace system it was shown that
applying ISHM increased profit by 11%, reduced cost by a factor of 2.4 and lengthened
the inspection intervals by a factor of 1.5. It would be interesting to try to modify and use
this framework for a system that does not have a clear identification for revenue, such as
military systems which can benefit by a reduction in the total life cycle cost (LCC).
Further it would also be interesting to modify this approach to include sensor degradation
and its effect on the aircraft life cycle.
Esperon-Miguez et al. (2012) studied a methodology that takes advantage of the
historical maintenance data available for legacy platforms to determine the performance
requirements for diagnostic and prognostic tools to achieve a certain reduction in
maintenance costs and time. The effect of these tools on the maintenance process is
studied using Event Tree Analysis, from which the equations are derived. However,
many of the parameters included in the formulas are in reality not constant and tend to
vary randomly around a mean value (e.g.: shipping costs of parts, repair times),
introducing uncertainties in the results. As a consequence, the equations are modified to
take into account the variance of all variables. Additionally, the reliability of the
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information generated using diagnostic and prognostic tools can be affected by multiple
characteristics of the fault, which are never exactly the same, meaning the performance of
these tools might not be constant either. To tackle this issue, formulas to determine the
acceptable variance in the performance of a health monitoring tool are derived under the
assumption that the variables considered follow Gaussian distributions.
Leao et al. (2008) proposed a cost benefit analysis methodology. This study
presents a methodology to perform cost-benefit analysis on the application of PHM for
existing (legacy) commercial aircraft. The methodology takes into account the
characteristics of the commercial aircraft operation business to yield conclusions on the
economic feasibility of the application of the technology to these platforms. The study
presented guidelines to develop such calculations and the tools that may be used to
analyze the results. The final product of the methodology is a cost benefit model which
provides insight to the aircraft’s original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and to the
aircraft operator on how PHM technologies should be applied in order to maximize their
bottom lines. One of the draw backs of this model is that it treats false alarm rate as a
constant value provided by the PHM technology manufacturer.
Another cost model was presented by Hou-bo and Jian-min (2011). When they
considered adopting and selecting a PHM technology, the first important step is to
conduct the cost-benefit analysis. The purpose of implementing a PHM technology is to
reduce failure rates and reduce cost needed for repair action. They proposed a CostBenefit Model for PHM to identify the main factors of implementing PHM which can
provide costs benefits. Obviously, none of the presented benefits come for free. Both the
manufacturer and the operator must invest money in order to implement PHM. The costs
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associated with development and operation, training costs of maintenance people and
operations were taken into consideration. The model can be a useful tool for decisionmaking and maintenance planning. On the other hand, for a SHM system, a different
approach is needed because the structure is not designed and treated like a component
that fails abruptly as considered in their study. The approach would need to be augmented
to include sensors that are continuously monitoring a crack growth.
Another approach by Kacprzynski et al. (2002) involves the developments
associated with a PHM system design tool that integrates a model-based Failure Mode,
Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) methodology with state-of-the-art system
simulation directly linked to downstream Life Cycle Costs (LCC). This design tool will
seek out recommended PHM system designs based on a cost function that accurately
represents key LCC variables such as system availability, maintainability, reliability, and
failure mode observability. The tool will be capable of assessing PHM sensor
requirement specifications at the component and subsystem levels, and will then allow
for integration into a broader integrated system model. Tradeoff, sensitivity and “what if”
analysis will then allow the designer/user to examine the cost/benefit relationship of
either adding or removing sensor and algorithms under consideration for the PHM
design. This study is different from that proposed in this dissertation since it does not
focus on the effect of degradation on the sensors. Further, it does not investigate the
interaction between component degradation and sensor degradation and how it affects
resulting events and availability of the aircraft.
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Optimization and simulation models
The number of sensors needs to be optimized to provide the desired effectiveness
within cost and weight constraints as well as a balance between detection sensitivity,
false alarms and the number of sensors.
A promising area for optimization is the use of genetic algorithms, which allows
the determination of the optimal number and location of sensors for damage locations
(Boller, 2000). Optimization and simulation of a maintenance phase with SHM
technology was used by Kapoor et al. (2008) to quantify benefits when applied to
commercial aircraft. The effect of using SHM technologies to reduce maintenance
downtime was provided. The concept of this approach was to identify the critical paths
along the maintenance process. After a critical maintenance path was identified it was
substituted with a SHM alternative. After optimization and simulation, a reduction factor
of 6 to 100 hrs was found. This study indicates that further work for a better estimate of
savings should involve employing the method proposed to a Maintenance Planning
Document (MPD) with defined maintenance phases. Also this study did not include the
effect of false alarms by SHM system.
Williams (2006) suggested that the performance improvement on a system by
implementing Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) can be evaluated before
design dollars are ever committed or contracts signed. By identifying the processes,
measures of effectiveness (MOE), and input drivers, a discrete event simulation can be
applied to assess the first order requirements for IVHM implementation on systems.
Williams (2006) discusses the benefits to 5 different categories of operators: 1) the
Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), 2) the mission operators, 3)
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command/control elements, 4) fleet management, 5) and maintenance operators. These
five categories may overlap in organizational structure and personnel, but they have
clearly identifiable processes and performance that can be analyzed and measured. The
paper then goes on to discuss how IVHM technologies impact events in the field and how
the effects on individual events affect the MOEs of the larger system. Finally, an example
is illustrated of the impacts IVHM has on the field performance of a notional system from
a simulation run using a notional system and scenario data. This type of analysis enables
a larger business case to be developed to aid designers and planners in their decisions of
how to implement IVHM. It will be of great value to extend this study to include the
IVHM system’s change of performance over time due to degradation in the IVHM
sensors.
Standardization
Standardization of SHM systems across different platforms should help in
reducing the ownership cost as well. In the automobile industry, SHM has great potential
and has seen more aggressive application than the aircraft industry (e.g. On-Star System).
Integrated system health monitoring in an automobile typically monitors important
features such as Oil pressure, Engine Temperature, Tire pressure etc. (You, Krage, &
Jalics, 2005) in which it was shown that standardization of remote diagnostics and
maintenance systems between different automobile models will reduce cost
tremendously.
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Structural health monitoring cost models
In a study by Pattabhiraman et al. (2010), the cost effectiveness of progressive
inspection over scheduled inspection is analyzed. The lifecycle of an airplane was
modeled as blocks of damage propagation interspersed with inspection. The Paris model
(Beden et al., 2009) with random parameters is used to model damage growth and
detection probability during inspections and it is modeled by Palmberg’s expression
(Palmberg et al., 1986). SHM based progressive inspection were found to be 50% more
cost effective than schedule-based preventive inspections. The sensitivity of the lifecycle
cost to the inspection parameters has been studied. To accommodate critical panels which
must be manually inspected, a hybrid model of inspection is also proposed. The hybrid
model is found to have sufficient cost savings over a scheduled inspection model. In this
model false alarms and SHM operation cost were neglected.
Another study by Aldrin et al. (2007) presented a software package for integrating
NDE and SHM design with product life cycle management models. Hybrid life
management strategies for new and aging aircraft were proposed that combine traditional
nondestructive evaluation (NDE) methods and recently developed SHM technologies. In
recent times, a usual aim for managing the life of aircraft components that are critical or
that are subject to fatigue or corrosion damage is to attempt development of in situ
damage detection systems that can indicate when more detailed inspection is necessary.
This creates a need for decisions about the type and settings of sensors and signal
processing algorithms for the health monitoring system, and system type, settings, and
scheduling for NDE. How well these systems are matched will have great influence on
overall maintenance cost, aircraft availability and system reliability.
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A study conducted by Wilmering and Ramesh (2005) focused on the means for
assessing the impact of potential health management approaches on LCC as implemented
within a system-engineering framework. A disciplined approach to selecting appropriate
health management solutions to satisfy design and operational requirements was
presented, and a software tool for performing trade studies of alternate approaches'
impact on life cycle cost was discussed. A primary goal was to allow domain experts and
health management specialists to perform thorough life cycle cost analyses without
requiring the services of specialized cost analysts.
Summarization of gaps
There are a number of cost benefits studies for integrated system or vehicle health
monitoring ISHM/IVHM. A fewer number of studies focus on the structural health
monitoring system SHM LCC benefits. It is found by this literature review that a business
case that relates LC events and aircraft availability to crack propagation, crack detection
and sensor degradation has not been investigated. The sensors used for crack detection
degrade over time due to flight stress. This is also accompanied by crack propagation due
to the same flight stress. The use of current crack propagation modeling techniques
accompanied with current structural health monitoring sensor degradation models should
yield more realistic LC benefit analysis for the decision maker. In this effort, the overall
LC model should also account for the effect on safety and availability due to sensor
replacement triggered by SHM scheduled and unscheduled maintenance.
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The following is Chapter III and it contains a journal article accepted by the Tech
Science Press Structural Durability and Health Monitoring (SDHM) journal on July 2014.
The title of the article is (Structure Health Monitoring (SHM) System Trade Space).
Previously (Kuhn and Soni, 2009) described performance of SHM sensors and an
approach to modeling them vs. accumulated flight hours on an aircraft. This paper builds
on the work of Kuhn and others to explore the trade space associated with detection, false
alarms, unscheduled maintenance actions and mishaps associated with an installed SHM
system with realistic crack growth assumptions. In this paper, an approach to modeling
the SHM detection performance as well as the changes occurring with the aircraft
structure is demonstrated. This model is used to evaluate candidate levels for a sensor
threshold with predictable performance regarding detection, missed detections and false
alarms. It provides an analytic basis for establishing a business case for SHM
implementation.
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III. Structure Health Monitoring (SHM) System Trade Space Analysis

Salman A. Albinali and David R. Jacques
Abstract
An analytic approach to exploring the tradespace associated with Structural
Health Monitoring (SHM) systems is presented. Modeling and simulation of the life
cycle of a legacy aircraft and the expected operational and maintenance events that could
occur is shown. A focus on the SHM system detection of a significant crack length and
the possibility of False Alarm (FA), miss detection and mishap events is investigated.
The modeling approach allows researchers to explore the tradespace associated with safe
and critical crack lengths, sensor thresholds, scheduled maintenance intervals, falsely
triggered maintenance actions, and mishaps due to missed detections. As one might
expect, it was observed that setting the SHM system very conservatively (closer to safe
crack levels) increases detection but causes a high number of FA events. On the other
hand setting the SHM system threshold higher to tolerate a greater crack length reduces
FA events but increases the number of Miss Detection events. Furthermore as cracks
propagate to a greater length it was observed that Miss Detection events can lead to
catastrophic failures causing (mishap) events. The analytic approach described herein
allows one to determine an acceptable balance between safety of flight and acceptable FA
rates. The novelty of this approach is providing a life cycle analysis for a legacy aircraft
equipped with SHM system with expected events (FA, Miss Detections) that could
impact the life cycle and cost-benefit analysis. This was accomplished by combining the
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method used in MIL-HDBK-1823 and Paris’s model and integrating it into a life cycle
model reflecting changing crack size and detection in every flight sortie until the end of
the life of the aircraft. This enables users to estimate the frequency of event occurrences
and the costs associated with these events, thus contributing to a more accurate life cycle
cost (LCC) analysis for an aircraft equipped with an SHM system. While the current
model is applicable to crack propagation in metallic structures, analytic expressions for
sensor signal variation associated with other damage/structure types would allow the
current model to be extended for those applications.

Keywords: Structural Health Monitoring, Fatigue Crack Growth, Probability of
Detection, False Alarms, Missed Detections

Nomenclature

𝑎

crack length

𝑎�

system response signal to a crack length

𝑎�𝑡ℎ

signal threshold for a crack size detected 50% of the time by the SHM

𝑎𝑐𝑟

critical crack length at which failure occurs

𝑎𝑡ℎ

a crack size detected 50% of the time by the SHM system

system

𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 minimum significant crack length
𝑎0

initial flaw size (crack length)

𝛽0

regression line intercept

𝛽1

regression line slope
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𝐶

material constant

𝛥𝐾

difference between the stress intensity factors

𝛥𝛿

pressure differential due to the stress load

𝐾𝐼𝐶

fracture toughness

𝐾𝑚𝑖𝑛

minimum stress intensity factor

𝑚

𝑁

number of load cycles

𝜎

standard deviation associated with probability of 𝑎� given 𝑎

𝐾𝑚𝑎𝑥 maximum stress intensity factor
material constant

Introduction
Operation and Maintenance (O&M) of aircraft often accounts for 70-80% or more
of the total Life Cycle Costs (LCC) of military and civilian aircraft (Gilmore and Valaika,
1992). For this reason, aircraft operators and maintainers are always looking for ways to
reduce the O&M burden for both new and legacy aircraft. Maintenance schedules are
selected conservatively based on flight safety, but a higher frequency of scheduled
maintenance increases O&M cost and may make it more likely that the maintenance
actions themselves introduce system faults. Performing maintenance tasks in a timely
manner, with reduced cost and improved safety, is critically important for successful
operation of any system, especially as resources are becoming scarce. If we examine the
military aerospace field we note that many legacy systems will be operating beyond their
original design life due to funding delays or schedule slips associated with new
replacement aircraft. Life extension programs have often been implemented on these
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legacy systems so that they can operate safely and effectively until a replacement system
is available. Even with a life extension program, however, operating a legacy system can
incur significant operations and support costs.
One of the major concerns for aging aircraft is the structural health of the system.
As the structure accumulates flight hours, cracks develop and propagate in that structure.
In response, Non-Destructive Inspections (NDI) are used by the maintenance crews to
find these cracks and perform maintenance if they grow beyond what is considered a safe
length. These NDI are preformed periodically, usually based on flight hours. These
inspections have some negative aspects associated with them. NDI causes aircraft down
time affecting mission readiness, and increasing labor hours and maintenance costs.
Further, between NDI intervals the length of the existing cracks in the structure are not
known, which raises safety concerns. Condition-Based Maintenance (CBM) has been
investigated in recent years to overcome these shortcomings by performing maintenance
when needed as opposed to relying on more conservative maintenance intervals (Cutter
and Thompson, 2005; Ellis, 2008).
One of the necessary tools to achieve CBM is to continuously monitor the system.
Structure Health Monitoring (SHM) is an approach that employs methods and tools to
monitor the health of the structure continuously through on-board sensors, promising
higher safety level and reduction in cost through extended inspection intervals and
continuous monitoring. Many of the necessary SHM technologies are available, yet we
see a slow implementation of these systems on operational platforms. Further, challenges
involved in the development and transition of SHM technology including issues
concerned with design, installations and validation methods for damage detection are still
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present (Beard and Banerjee, 2011). It has been suggested that the lack of a solid business
case clearly analyzing the cost benefit of a SHM system is one of the main causes of the
slow implementation of such a system (Derrisoet al., 2007; Perez et al., 2010). False
Alarms (FA) from a SHM system will cause unnecessary maintenance actions, thus
raising cost and aircraft availability concerns. Missed detections that might also occur
when using a SHM system also create safety concerns. It is clear that these factors have a
major impact on the business case. Trade space analysis that considers fatigue crack
growth rates, SHM sensor performance, scheduled inspection intervals, and event costs is
needed. This paper presents a trade space analysis for a legacy fighter equipped with an
SHM system throughout its life cycle. Modeling and simulation using Monte Carlo
analysis in the MATLAB® programming environment will be used as the trade space
analysis tool. While the current model is applicable to crack propagation in metallic
structures, analytic expressions for sensor signal variation associated with other
damage/structure types would allow the current model to be extended for those
applications.
Fatigue crack growth
Fatigue crack growth predictions are used to estimate the design life of aircraft
structural components. They are used in design where a structural component is expected
to operate safely with an existing crack until the crack reaches a length that is detectable
by NDI, but less than a critical length (Roylance, 2001). Paris’s Law is one of the most
widely used fatigue crack growth models and was used in this research effort (Paris and
Erdogan, 1963).

25

Paris’s Law
Under a fatigue stress regime Paris’s Law relates sub-critical crack growth to
stress intensity factor. The basic formula has the following form:

𝑑𝑎
𝑑𝑁

= 𝐶∆𝐾 𝑚

(2)

The term on the left side is known as the crack growth rate, where 𝑎 is the crack

length and 𝑁 is the number of load cycles. The crack growth rate indicates the crack

length growth per accumulated number of load cycles. 𝐶 and 𝑚 are material constants
and ∆𝐾 is the difference between the stress intensity factor at maximum loading and
minimum loading:

∆𝐾 = 𝐾𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝐾𝑚𝑖𝑛 = ∆𝛿 √𝜋𝑎

(3)

where 𝐾𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximum stress intensity factor, 𝐾𝑚𝑖𝑛 is the minimum stress

intensity factor and ∆δ is the pressure differential due to the stress load.
Probability of detection (POD)

The primary focus of a SHM system is to reliably detect a significant crack length
𝑎 just like the NDI does, but to perform this task continuously during operation of the

system. The performance of a SHM system can be demonstrated using 𝑃𝑂𝐷(𝑎) curves.
(Kuhn and Soni, 2009; Kuhn, 2009) showed that 𝑃𝑂𝐷(𝑎) can be evaluated using the
following formula:
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𝛽0 +𝛽1 ∗ln(𝑎)−ln(𝑎�𝑡ℎ )

𝑃𝑂𝐷(𝑎) = 𝑃(𝑎� > 𝑎�𝑡ℎ ) = 𝛷 �

𝜎

�

(4)

𝑃𝑂𝐷(𝑎) is modeled by performing linear regression on an 𝑎 vs. 𝑎� functional

relation that has normally distributed residuals with constant variance, where 𝑎� is the

measured system response of a NDI system to a crack of length 𝑎. Units depend on the
particular inspection system. MIL-HDBK-1823 (Department of Defense, 1999),

describes NDI experimental data showing a linear regression line relationship relating
ln(𝑎) to ln(𝑎� ), where 𝛽0 is the regression line intercept, 𝛽1 is the slope, 𝑎�𝑡ℎ is the signal

threshold for a NDI system (the value of 𝑎� below which the signal is determined to have
been caused by a crack of insignificant length) and 𝜎 is the standard deviation of the

residuals of a linear regression fit of 𝑎 vs. 𝑎� data as represented in Figure 1 (Department
of Defense, 1999). A more intuitive explanation of the generation of the POD equation

showing practitioners how properties of SHM data affect the rotation and translation of
the POD curve was pressed by (Pado et al., 2013).
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Figure
Figure 1: Linear regression fit of ln(𝑎) vs. ln(𝑎� ) data (Department of Defense, 1999)

Confusion Matrix
In a scenario where a NDI or SHM system is attempting binary detection
(crack/no-crack) of a crack of length 𝑎 there are four possible outcomes:
1)

The system detects a crack and a crack of significant length actually
exists; this is declared a True Detection event;

2)

The system detects a crack and either the crack does not exist or the length
of the crack is not considered significant; this is declared a FA event;

3)

The system does not detect a crack and a crack of significant length does
not exist; this is a True Negative event;

4)

The system does not detect a crack but a crack of significant length exists;
this is a Missed Detection event.
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These four probabilities can be represented in a “Confusion Matrix” shown in
Figure 2 (Fawcett, 2006). The confusion matrix is used for predictive analysis.
Typically, the probabilities appearing in the matrix are determined through test or
historical data collection.

Figure 2: Confusion Matrix

In operating an aircraft, FA rates or false calls raise concerns due to the fact that
these will drive unnecessary maintenance actions that will affect mission readiness and
cost. Even beyond concerns for unnecessary maintenance actions, false alarms could
result in premature mission terminations. Missed Detections raise concerns due to the
fact that they might cause an aircraft mishap due to unforeseen/undetected structural
problems. A graphical representation of the confusion matrix probabilities distributions
plus the threshold level of an NDI or SHM system is represented in Figure 3 (Kuhn,
2009).
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Figure 3: Graphical representation of the probabilities and the Threshold Detection Level
(Kuhn, 2009)

It is important to note that adding the FA and True Negative probabilities equals
1. Likewise adding the True Detection and Miss Detection probabilities equals 1. It can
be observed from Fig. 3 that varying the threshold 𝑎�𝑡ℎ will affect sensor performance.

Moving 𝑎�𝑡ℎ to the right will result in less FA and less Detections. Moving 𝑎�𝑡ℎ to the left
will result in more Detections and more FA. The variance (standard deviation) of the

response signal 𝑎� can also affect sensor performance as it will determine the amount of
overlap for pdfs associated with a given crack length and that associated with a “safe”
structure. In this research the effect of a crack growth on a legacy fighter will be
simulated for each sortie up to the time when a mishap (catastrophic failure) occurs or the
end of the design life of the aircraft is reached, whichever occurs first. For every sortie,

30

corresponding to a set number of load cycles, SHM system detection will be simulated
based on the current crack size and sensor performance, POD(a).
For this analysis, the SHM system will be assumed to follow an NDI-like
detection trend whereby a larger crack will generate a larger mean signal response; the
analysis approach easily supports a piezo-like sensor whereby the trend is reversed
(larger cracks generate smaller mean signal response). An event corresponding to one of
the quadrants of the confusion matrix will occur at each sortie. First, a true detection
event will trigger an inspection and a repair action will occur. Second, a FA event
triggering an inspection can occur. For an FA event, subsequent NDI will identify the
true crack size. In this research, NDI performed post-flight is assumed to be perfect; in
future work this assumption will be relaxed. Third, a missed detection event triggering
the possibility of a mishap can occur. A missed detection of a crack that is still less than
some defined critical length will not cause a mishap; however, missed detection of a
crack that grows to a length equal to or exceeding a critical length will result in a mishap.
Finally, a true negative event triggers no action, and the aircraft is assumed ready for the
next sortie.
Varying the sensor detection threshold, 𝑎�𝑡ℎ , minimum crack length detected

requiring a repair action, 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 , and the standard deviation of the distribution will be

investigated to study the effects of these SHM system sensor performance parameters on
the number of maintenance events and mishaps that occur. For this research, a single
critical crack location is modeled, but the methods described herein are extensible to
multiple crack locations, and future work will extend the model to accommodate them.
Further, this method is applicable for damage detection in composite panels where the
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extent of the damage is an area (compared to crack length) and the extent of the damage
includes severity. As long as experimental data can show and reflect a relationship
existing between damage characteristics/severity and signal response by SHM system
that could be later modeled this method is applicable.
Methodology
Modeling and simulation using MATLAB® was the method used in this research.
Figure 4 shows an event flow diagram depicting SHM related events for a legacy aircraft
equipped with SHM system.

Figure 4: Flow diagram for SHM equipped aircraft
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The simulation model starts at takeoff, depicted on the bottom left side of Figure
4. To initialize the model, a threshold, 𝑎�𝑡ℎ , safe crack length, 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 , and a standard

deviation σ are set and kept for the life time of the aircraft. An initial flaw size is used to
initialize the crack growth model based on the Paris model discussed previously (Paris
and Erdogan, 1963). After takeoff, the model generates a probability distribution for the
crack length in that specific sortie based on the growth model and the number of
accumulated flight hours in service or since previous crack repair. A Monte Carol draw is
initiated simulating SHM system detection. If the system response signal 𝑎� is less than
𝑎�𝑡ℎ no SHM detection occurred. The model will check if the crack length 𝑎 is greater
than the critical crack length, 𝑎𝑐𝑟 . If that is true the model will declare a catastrophic

structure failure leading to an aircraft mishap. Otherwise the aircraft will land. Then the
model will check if 𝑎 is greater than 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 , and if that is true a missed detection event

will be recorded. Note that while missed detections are recorded in the simulation for

later analysis, the SHM system has no knowledge that a missed detection has occurred.
If no detection occurs and 𝑎 < 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 , a true negative event will be recorded. If the

aircraft reached its maximum life the simulation run for this aircraft will end and a new
simulation run will start; otherwise, the model will propagate the crack length by the
amount simulated for one sortie and takeoff again. For any sortie, if 𝑎� is greater than 𝑎�𝑡ℎ ,

SHM detection occurs and the sortie will be aborted. An inspection will occur and if 𝑎 is
greater than 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 , a true detection event will be recorded. The crack length will be reset
simulating a repair or a replacement of a structural component and the aircraft will take
off again. If 𝑎 is less than 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 , a FA event will be recorded, the crack 𝑎 will be
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propagated, and the aircraft will takeoff again. This will continue until the end of design
life or catastrophic failure of the aircraft. For a given set of 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 , 𝑎�𝑡ℎ and σ, 100

simulation runs will be performed, each one having a randomly selected initial flaw size
and growth rate parameter. After that a different set of 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 , 𝑎�𝑡ℎ and σ will be used so

trade space analysis on the affect of SHM sensor performance and crack length on events
can be performed.
Fatigue crack growth subroutine
A fatigue crack growth subroutine model was developed to simulate the crack
length propagation in every sortie. By integrating the Paris model Equation 2 and solving
for 𝑎𝑖 which is the crack length after 𝑁𝑖 cycles (flights) we get (An et al., 2012):
𝑚

𝑚

1−

𝑎𝑖 = �𝑁𝑖 𝐶 �1 − 2 � �∆𝛿 √𝜋� + 𝑎0

2
𝑚 2−𝑚
2

�

(5)

where 𝑎0 is assumed to be the initial flaw size (crack length) existing in a new or repaired
structural component (Heida and Grooteman, 1998). Uncertainty is applied to the value

of 𝑎0 to reflect that this value is different every time a repair or replacement is done to the

structure. The pressure differential, ∆δ, due to the stress load can be evaluated by using
the expression (An et al., Chol, 2012):

∆𝛿 =

𝐾𝐼𝐶

�𝑎𝑐𝑟 𝜋
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(6)

where 𝐾𝐼𝐶 is the fracture toughness, a material property provided by the manufacturer of
the structural component. ∆δ is modeled with uncertainty to simulate the variation in

loads an aircraft structure is exposed to for any given sortie. Figure 5 is a presentation of
the fatigue crack growth simulation with 10 runs reflecting 10 repairs or replacements to
the structural component.

Figure 5: Fatigue crack growth simulation results for 10 runs

It is shown in Figure 5 that every run has a different 𝑎0 and the growth rate with

different loads ∆δ causing the crack to propagate differently after each replacement or

repair. Also a representation of 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 , a minimum crack considered to be significant for
SHM monitoring is shown on the figure. Detected cracks of length smaller than 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒

will not be repaired. The figure also shows 𝑎𝑡ℎ , a crack size having an associated SHM
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response designated as the threshold for detection, 𝑎�𝑡ℎ . Both 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 and 𝑎�𝑡ℎ will be varied
to simulate the performance of the SHM system.
Probability of detection subroutine
A probability of detection (POD) simulation subroutine was developed to
simulate the SHM system response to a crack length occurring for every sortie. A
probability of detection of the threshold crack 𝑎𝑡ℎ , detected 50% of the time, will be
evaluated using Equation 4 in the following form:

𝛽0 +𝛽1 ∗ln(𝑎𝑡ℎ )−ln(𝑎�𝑡ℎ )
�
𝜎

𝑃𝑂𝐷(𝑎) = 0.5 = 𝛷 �

(7)

The signal threshold 𝑎�𝑡ℎ will be solved for and used in the following equation:
𝛽0 +𝛽1 ∗ln(𝑎)−ln(𝑎�𝑡ℎ )
�
𝜎

𝑃𝑂𝐷(𝑎) = 𝑃(𝑎� > 𝑎�𝑡ℎ ) = 𝛷 �

(8)

where the crack length 𝑎 from the fatigue crack growth simulation will be used and a

Monte Carlo draw will be preformed every sortie. The constants 𝛽0 and 𝛽1 are evaluated
by performing linear regression on experimental data provided by MIL-HDBK-1823

(Department of Defense, 1999). Since varying 𝑎𝑡ℎ will directly vary 𝑎�𝑡ℎ as shown from
the previous equations, only 𝑎𝑡ℎ will be used in the rest of the discussion. The variables

𝑎𝑡ℎ and 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 are held constant for a given run, but varied for different simulation runs as

a percentage of 𝑎𝑐𝑟 . Also, the standard deviation σ associated with the 𝑎� vs. 𝑎 pdf will be
set for a given simulation run and varied for different runs.
Parameter Values and Recorded Events
The main simulation routine tallies several different events for the tradespace
analysis. The number of FA events and Miss Detection events will be recorded for
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different sets of 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 , 𝑎𝑡ℎ and σ. The parameter 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 will have five values, and for

every value of 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 , 𝑎𝑡ℎ will have a corresponding eight values and σ will have four

values. For each combination of 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 , 𝑎𝑡ℎ , and σ, 100 simulation runs will conducted

and the average FA and Miss Detection events will be calculated. The results will be
displayed and discussed in the following section.
Results and Discussion
FA events
Figure 6 (a) displays the effect of fixing the standard deviation σ at 0.1 and

varying 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 with the values 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9% of 𝑎𝑐𝑟 . For every 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 value, the 𝑎𝑡ℎ

value was incremented eight times starting at 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 using increments of 1% of 𝑎𝑐𝑟 . For

example, if 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 = 5% 𝑎𝑐𝑟 then 𝑎𝑡ℎ will be incremented as 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12%

of 𝑎𝑐𝑟 . This is repeated for Figure 6 (b), (c) and (d) with standard deviation σ = 0.2, 0.3,
and 0.4. It is observed from Figure 6 (a) that as 𝑎𝑡ℎ is moved about 2% from 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 a

significant drop in the number of FA events is noticed. The greater the 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 percentage

the greater the number of false alarm events recorded. From Fig. 6(b), as the standard

deviation is increased from σ = 0.1 to σ = 0.2, it is observed that we have the same trend
shown in Figure 6 (a) but with an increase in FA events. Also it is observed that an
increase of 𝑎𝑡ℎ by about 3% over 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 essentially eliminates FA events. From Figure 6
(c), as the standard deviation is increased from σ = 0.2 to σ = 0.3, it is observed that we

have the same trend shown in Figure 6 (b) with very close FA events, but it now requires
an increase of 𝑎𝑡ℎ by about 5% over 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 to essentially eliminate FA events. Similarly

in Figure 6 (d), as the standard deviation is increased from σ = 0.3 to σ = 0.4, it is
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observed that it now requires an increase of 𝑎𝑡ℎ by about 8% over 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 to essentially
eliminate FA events. 95% confidence intervals bars are shown on all figures based on
100 simulation runs.

Figure 6: % 𝑎𝑡ℎ of 𝑎𝑐𝑟 for a crack detected 50% of the time vs. Average number of FA
events for different standard deviation levels 𝜎

Miss Detection events
From Figure 7 (a) we observe that if 𝑎𝑡ℎ is moved about 3% above 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 a

significant increase in number of Miss Detection events is noticed. Note that a single
missed detection is not fatal as long as detection on a subsequent sortie occurs prior to the
crack reaching a critical length. From Figure 7 (b) it is observed that, as the standard
deviation is increased for σ = 0.1 to σ = 0.2, the same trend as Figure 7 (a) is shown, but
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𝑎𝑡ℎ needs to be at least 4% more than 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 to reach the same number of Miss Detection
events shown in Figure 7 (a). A similar trend is shown in Figure 7 (c) where it is

observed that, as the standard deviation is increased from σ = 0.2 to σ = 0.3, 𝑎𝑡ℎ needs to
be at least 5% more than 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 to reach the same number of Miss Detection events as

shown in Fig. 7(b). For σ = 0.4, shown in Figure 7 (d), 𝑎𝑡ℎ needs to be at least 6% more
than 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 to reach the same number of Miss Detection events as shown in Figure 7 (c).

In general, a decrease in the standard deviation and an increase in the difference between
𝑎𝑡ℎ and 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 results in an increase in the average number of Miss Detection events.
Referring back to Figure 3, an increase in the standard deviation of the distributions

results in greater overlap, improving the Miss Detection performance at the expense of
higher FA rates.
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Figure 7: % 𝑎𝑡ℎ of 𝑎𝑐𝑟 for a crack detected 50% of the time vs. Average number of Miss
Detection events for different standard deviation levels 𝜎

Average crack length detected after a Miss Detection event
It is of interest to know the average crack length once detected after a Miss
Detection event as percentage of 𝑎𝑐𝑟 as it reflects a safety concern. As noted previously,

an initial missed detection can be detected during a later sortie as long as it does not reach
the critical length causing a mishap. Before discussing these results, it is important to
note that each detection attempt is treated independently, and the treatment herein
assumes no degradation of the sensor (although research accounting for sensor
degradation over time is ongoing). The following plots represent the simulation output
for the crack length once detected as a percentage of 𝑎𝑐𝑟 .
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Figure 8: % 𝑎𝑡ℎ of 𝑎𝑐𝑟 for a crack detected 50% of the time vs. Average length of a crack
detected after a miss detection event as a percentage of 𝑎𝑐𝑟 for different standard
deviation levels 𝜎

From Figure 8(a) it can be observed that, as 𝑎𝑡ℎ is increased further away from

𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 , the crack length once detected after initial miss detection increases. Also, as

expected, a greater value of 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 results in greater crack lengths once detected, which

can become problematic as they approach a critical length. The obvious contribution to
this increase is the fact that, as 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 is increased, the size of the smallest crack that you
intend to detect increases. However, it is important to note that the crack growth rate

monitonically increases (see Figure 5); higher values for 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 result in higher growth
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rates for 𝑎 > 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 . Sweeping across Figure 8(a), (b), (c) and (d) to observe the effect of

change in standard deviation, it is noted that the length of the crack once detected is the
greatest for the smallest 𝜎 = 0.1 and the greatest 𝑎𝑡ℎ . This can be expected as the

combination of these parameter trends increases the separation and decreases the overlap
between the “safe” and “detectable” crack distributions. As the standard deviation
increases there is a smaller change in the length of the crack detected after a Miss
Detection event is observed due to greater overlap between the distributions.
Miss detection leading to a catastrophic failure
The previous section leads one to the question as to what values for 𝑎𝑡ℎ and 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒

result in a significant chance that a Miss Detection leads to a catastrophic failure (𝑎 ≥

𝑎𝑐𝑟 ) of the structure component. Based on the crack growth model, growth is very slow

for low numbers of load cycles (or sorties), but increases significantly as the load cycles
accumulate. The simulation is coded to flag every time the crack length 𝑎 is equal or

greater than the critical length 𝑎𝑐𝑟 and declare a catastrophic failure, and these results will
be shown for increasing values of 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 and 𝑎𝑡ℎ .

Figure 9 displays the effect on the percentage of mishaps based on varying the

threshold 𝑎𝑡ℎ from 50% to 90% of 𝑎𝑐𝑟 . For this analysis, 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 was set at 50% of 𝑎𝑐𝑟 and
the standard deviation σ was set at 0.4. It is observed that varying 𝑎𝑡ℎ from 50% to about

55% of 𝑎𝑐𝑟 did not result in any aircraft mishap events from the simulation runs. Once

the threshold is increased beyond 55% of 𝑎𝑐𝑟 mishap events are noticed. Setting the

threshold set at 65% 𝑎𝑐𝑟 resulted in approximately 10% mishap events (based on 100
simulation runs). As expected, the trend of increasing mishap rates for increasing
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detection thresholds continued. This preliminary analysis clearly shows how tradespace
analysis can be conducted to show safe operating regimes resulting in minimal
probabilities of catastrophic failure and acceptable false alarm rates.

Figure 9: % 𝑎𝑡ℎ of 𝑎𝑐𝑟 for a crack detected 50% of the time vs. Average mishap
percentage of number of simulation runs

Conclusion
Summary and findings
The tradespace analysis approach described herein shows how SHM sensor
performance design parameters 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 , 𝑎𝑡ℎ and σ can affect the number of FA, Missed
Detections and mishap events that could occur over the expected life of an aircraft. If
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design parameters are set conservatively with regards to safety, a high number of false
alarms will result, with a subsequent increase in maintenance events and cost.
Conversely, higher value for 𝑎𝑡ℎ with respect to 𝑎𝑐𝑟 result in a reduction in FA events,

but an increase of Miss Detection. Further increase in 𝑎𝑡ℎ with respect to acr can result in

Miss Detection events leading to mishaps. With safety of flight as a primary

consideration, the SHM system sensor parameters can be adjusted to reduce the
probability of mishap events to an acceptably low level while also keeping FA rates, and
related maintenance costs, at an acceptable level.
Future work
Although installing an SHM system with a certain expected performance might
produce expected cost savings, better operational readiness and improved safety, the
degradation of the SHM system will be a concern in its own right. Any system installed
on an aircraft is likely to degrade with operation. Systems installed on aircraft typically
require maintenance and inspection schedules to ensure continued acceptable operation.
The same is true for the SHM system. Kuhn’s research (Kuhn and Soni, 2009; Kuhn,
2009) concluded that degradation to the SHM system sensors due to flight loads affect
the performance of such a system. Ongoing work is investigating the effect of
degradation on SHM performance parameters such as 𝑎�𝑡ℎ and σ, amongst others, on the

FA, Miss Detection and mishap events an aircraft might experience. Also maintenance of
the SHM system itself will be considered. SHM system unscheduled maintenance will be
based on the maximum FA events encountered between SHM system scheduled
maintenance intervals which will be based on flight hours. Extensions to this work for
composite structures and other damage types are also being investigated.
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The following is Chapter IV and it contains a journal article that will be submitted
to the Journal of Structure Health Monitoring. The title of the article is (Utility and Effect
of Employing a Variable Threshold for Countering the Effect of Degrading SHM
Sensors). Kuhn and Soni (2009) previously described performance and degradation of
SHM sensors and an approach to modeling them vs. accumulated flight hours on an
aircraft. This paper builds on the work of Kuhn and others to explore the effect of sensor
degradation on detection, false alarms, unscheduled maintenance actions and mishaps
associated with an installed SHM system with realistic crack growth assumptions. In this
paper, an approach to modeling the SHM detection performance/ sensor degradation as
well as the changes occurring with the aircraft structure is demonstrated. Also the utility
and effect of employing a variable threshold is discussed. This model is used to evaluate
sensor performance under degradation with predictable performance regarding detection,
missed detections and false alarms. It provides an analytic basis for establishing a
business case for the SHM system implementation.
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IV. Utility and Effect of Employing a Variable Threshold for Countering the Effect
of Degrading SHM Sensors

Salman A. Albinali , David R. Jacques, Christine M. Schubert Kabban and Alan Johnson
Abstract
The degradation associated with a Structural Health Monitoring (SHM) system’s sensors
is considered using an analytic approach. Expected operational and maintenance events that could
occur due to degradation is explored though modeling and simulation of the life cycle of a legacy
aircraft. The SHM system’s ability to detect a crack of significant length degrades over time, and
it affects both the possibility of False Alarm (FA) and Miss Detection events. Degradation in the
SHM system increases the number of FA events which raises a maintenance cost concern.
Degradation also causes a concurrent reduction in the number of Miss Detection events. The
analysis demonstrates that employing a variable detection threshold to counter the effect of
degradation can significantly lower the number of FA events while maintaining Miss Detection
events at an acceptable and safe level. Uncertainties in the assumed degradation factors are
accounted for in the model, resulting in degraded performance, but a variable threshold is still
capable of maintaining FA events lower than they would be for the constant threshold case.
Determining acceptable FA and Miss Detection rates by employing a variable threshold to
counter the effect of degradation can be achieved using the analytic approach described herein.
This paper provides a life cycle analysis for a legacy aircraft equipped with a SHM system with
degrading sensors leading to events (FA, Miss Detections) that could impact the life cycle and
cost-benefit analysis. The frequency of event occurrences and the costs associated with these
events can be estimates by users, thus contributing to a more accurate Life Cycle Cost (LCC)
analysis for an aircraft equipped with a degrading SHM system.
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Nomenclature
𝑎

crack length

𝑎�

system response signal to a crack length

𝑎�𝑡ℎ

signal threshold for a crack size detected 50% of the time by the SHM

𝑎𝑐𝑟

critical crack length at which failure occurs

𝑎𝑡ℎ

a crack size detected 50% of the time by the SHM system

system

𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 minimum significant crack length
𝑎0

initial flaw size (crack length)

𝛽1

regression line slope factor

𝐶

material constant

𝛼

degradation in the intercept factor

𝛽0

regression line intercept factor

𝛥𝛿

pressure differential due to the stress load

𝛥𝐾

difference between the stress intensity factors

𝛾

degradation in the slope factor

𝐾𝐼𝐶

fracture toughness

𝐾𝑚𝑖𝑛

minimum stress intensity factor

𝐾𝑚𝑎𝑥 maximum stress intensity factor
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𝜓

degradation in the standard deviation factor

𝑁

number of load cycles

𝑚

material constant

𝜎

standard deviation associated with probability of 𝑎� given 𝑎
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Introduction
It has been reported that 70-80% or more of the total Life Cycle Costs (LCC) of
military and civilian aircraft is due to the Operation and Maintenance (O&M) cost
(Gilmore and Valaika, 1992). Therefore, aircraft operators and maintainers are always
looking for ways to reduce the O&M burden for both new and legacy aircraft.
Maintenance schedules are selected conservatively based on flight safety, but a higher
frequency of scheduled maintenance increases O&M cost and may make it more likely
that the maintenance actions themselves introduce system faults. Performing
maintenance tasks in a timely manner, with reduced cost and improved safety, is
critically important for successful operation of any system, especially as resources are
becoming scarce. Examining the military aerospace field, one notes that many legacy
systems are or will be operating beyond their original design life due to funding delays or
schedule slips associated with new replacement aircraft. Life extension programs have
often been implemented on these legacy systems so that they can operate safely and
effectively until a replacement system is available.
Even with a life extension program, however, operating a legacy system can incur
significant operations and support costs. One of the major concerns for aging aircraft is
the structural health of the system. As the structure accumulates flight hours, cracks
develop and propagate in that structure. In response, Non-Destructive Inspections (NDI)
are used by the maintenance crews to find these cracks and perform maintenance if they
grow beyond what is considered a safe length. These NDI are preformed periodically,
usually based on flight hours. These inspections have some negative aspects associated
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with them. NDI cause aircraft down time affecting mission readiness, and increasing
labor hours and maintenance costs. Further, between NDI intervals the length of the
existing cracks in the structure are not known, which raises safety concerns. ConditionBased Maintenance (CBM) has been investigated in recent years to overcome these
shortcomings by performing maintenance when needed as opposed to relying on more
conservative maintenance intervals (Cutter and Thompson, 2005; Ellis, 2008).
One of the necessary tools to achieve CBM is to continuously monitor the system.
Structure Health Monitoring (SHM) is an approach that employs methods and tools to
monitor the health of the structure continuously through on-board sensors, promising
higher safety level and reduction in cost through extended inspection intervals and
continuous monitoring. Many of the necessary SHM technologies are available, yet we
see a slow implementation of these systems on operational platforms. It has been
suggested that the lack of a solid business case clearly analyzing the cost benefit of a
SHM system is one of the main causes of the slow implementation of such a system
(Derriso et al., 2007; Perez et al., 2010). Further, challenges involved in the development
and transition of SHM technology including issues concerned with design, installations
and validation methods for damage detection are still present (Beard and Banerjee, 2011).
False Alarms (FA) from a SHM system will cause unnecessary maintenance actions, thus
raising cost and aircraft availability concerns. Further, Missed detections from a SHM
system can cause safety concerns.
Degradation of the SHM system over the life time of an aircraft can have a great
impact on the SHM system performance, adversely effecting FA and Miss Detection
events. Many studies show degradation of SHM sensors over time due to static loads,
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cyclic loads, temperature and corrosion. Research by Achenbach (2007) indicated that
some of the technical challenges for sensors are that they need to be small, autonomous,
cheap, robust, repairable, accurate, densely distributed, measure local and system level
responses and designed to measure relevant damage parameters. There are typically
competing objectives that must be balanced by the system designer. Beard et al. (2005)
found that environmental conditions such as temperature can affect the signal obtained
from sensors. His research used calibration to compensate for temperature variation based
on the structure and application. A sensor diagnostics and validation process was
presented by Park et al. (2006). It performs in situ monitoring of the operational status of
a piezoelectric (PZT) active-sensor in SHM applications. Both degradation of the
mechanical/electrical properties of a PZT transducer and the bonding defects between a
PZT patch and a host structure could be identified by the proposed process. The proposed
process can provide a metric that can be used to determine the sensor functionality over a
long period of service time or after an extreme loading event. An investigation on the
effect of cyclic loads on sensor performance was conducted by Kuhn (2009). Degradation
was identified in sensor performance having a direct relationship with cyclic strain which
was estimated by using a power equation model in his research. A probability of
detection (POD) degradation model was also developed to show the overall performance
of a SHM system over time.
It is clear that these factors have a major impact on the business case. A benefit
study that considers fatigue crack growth rates, realistic probability of detection, SHM
sensor degradation, scheduled inspection intervals, SHM maintenance actions, and Life
cycle analysis and operation events is needed. This research is a follow on work of
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Albinali and Jacques (2014). The novelty of this research described herein is the benefit
study and analysis for a legacy fighter equipped with a SHM system that degrades
throughout the life cycle. SHM sensor degradation and its effect on operation and
maintenance events is considered. Realistic fatigue crack growth rates and probability of
detection is employed. Modeling and simulation using Monte Carlo analysis in the
MATLAB® programming environment is used to model the operational life of an aircraft
equipped with a degrading SHM system, and the potential impact of that system on life
cycle maintenance events.
Crack propagation model
Fatigue crack growth predictions are used to estimate the design life of aircraft
structural components. They are used in design where a structural component is
expected to operate safely with an existing crack until the crack reaches a length that is
detectable by NDI, but less than a critical length (Roylance, 2001). Paris’s Law is one of
the most widely used fatigue crack growth models and was used in this research effort
(Paris and Erdogan, 1963).
Paris’s Law
Under a fatigue stress regime Paris’s Law relates sub-critical crack growth to
stress intensity factor. The basic formula has the following form:

𝑑𝑎
𝑑𝑁

= 𝐶∆𝐾 𝑚

(9)

The term on the left side is known as the crack growth rate, where 𝑎 is the crack

length and 𝑁 is the number of load cycles. The crack growth rate indicates the crack
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length growth per accumulated number of load cycles. 𝐶 and 𝑚 are material constants
and ∆𝐾 is the difference between the stress intensity factor at maximum loading and
minimum loading:

∆𝐾 = 𝐾𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝐾𝑚𝑖𝑛 = ∆𝛿 √𝜋𝑎

(10)

where 𝐾𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximum stress intensity factor, 𝐾𝑚𝑖𝑛 is the minimum stress
intensity factor and ∆δ is the pressure differential due to the stress load.
Fatigue crack growth subroutine
A fatigue crack growth subroutine model was developed to simulate the crack
length propagation in every sortie. By integrating the Paris model Equation 9 and solving
for 𝑎𝑖 which is the crack length after 𝑁𝑖 cycles (flights) we get (An et al., 2012):

𝑚

𝑚

1−

𝑎𝑖 = �𝑁𝑖 𝐶 �1 − 2 � �∆𝛿 √𝜋� + 𝑎0

2
𝑚 2−𝑚
2

�

(11)

where 𝑎0 is assumed to be the initial flaw size (crack length) existing in a new or

repaired structural component (Heida and Grooteman, 1998). Uncertainty is applied to
the value of 𝑎0 to reflect that this value is different every time a repair or replacement is
done to the structure. The pressure differential, ∆δ, due to the stress load can be
evaluated by using the expression (An et al., 2012):
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∆𝛿 =

𝐾𝐼𝐶

(12)

�𝑎𝑐𝑟 𝜋

where 𝐾𝐼𝐶 is the fracture toughness, a material property provided by the manufacturer of
the structural component. ∆δ is modeled with uncertainty to simulate the variation in
loads an aircraft structure is exposed to after a repair or replacement of structural
component.
Crack detection model
Probability of detection (POD)
The primary focus of a SHM system is to reliably detect a significant crack
length 𝑎 just like the NDI, but to perform this task continuously during operation of the

system. The performance of a SHM system can be demonstrated using 𝑃𝑂𝐷(𝑎) curves.
Kuhn and Soni (2009) and Kuhn (2009) showed that 𝑃𝑂𝐷(𝑎) can be evaluated using
the following formula:

𝛽0 +𝛽1 ∗ln(𝑎)−ln(𝑎�𝑡ℎ )

𝑃𝑂𝐷(𝑎) = 𝑃(𝑎� > 𝑎�𝑡ℎ ) = 𝛷 �

𝜎

�

(13)

𝑃𝑂𝐷(𝑎) is modeled by performing linear regression on an 𝑎 vs. 𝑎� functional

relation that has normally distributed residuals with constant variance, where 𝑎� is the

measured system response of a NDI system to a crack of length 𝑎. Units depend on the
54

particular inspection system. MIL-HDBK-1823 (Department of Defense, 1999),
describes NDI experimental data showing a linear regression line relationship relating
ln(𝑎) to ln(𝑎� ), where 𝛽0 is the regression line intercept, 𝛽1 is the slope, 𝑎�𝑡ℎ is the signal
threshold for a NDI system (the value of 𝑎� below which the signal is determined to

have been caused by a crack of insignificant length) and 𝜎 is the standard deviation of
the residuals of a linear regression fit of 𝑎 vs. 𝑎� data. A more intuitive explanation of

the generation of the POD equation showing practitioners how properties of SHM data
affect the rotation and translation of the POD curve was pressed by Pado et al. (2013).
In an SHM system using piezoelectric sensors (PZT) using pitch-catch signals we get a
smaller signal response 𝑎� for a greater crack length 𝑎. This is opposite to NDI where a

greater signal response 𝑎� for a greater crack length 𝑎. The PZT POD relationship is
represented in Equation 14 and Figure 10 (Kuhn, 2009).

ln(𝑎�𝑡ℎ )−𝛽0 −𝛽1 ∗ln(𝑎)

𝑃𝑂𝐷(𝑎) = 𝑃(𝑎�𝑡ℎ > 𝑎� ) = 𝛷 �

𝜎

�

(14)

Figure 10: Linear regression fit of ln(𝑎) vs. ln(𝑎� ) data for SHM using PZT sensors (Kuhn,
2009)
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Confusion Matrix
In a scenario where an NDI or SHM system is attempting binary detection
(crack/no-crack) of a crack of length 𝑎 there are four possible outcomes:
1) The system detects a crack and a crack of significant length actually
exists, thus declared a True Detection event;
2) The system detects a crack and either the crack does not exist or the length of
the crack is not considered significant, thus declared a FA event;
3) The system does not detect a crack and a crack of significant length does not
exist, thus declared a True Negative event;
4) The system does not detect a crack but a crack of significant length exists; this
is a Missed Detection event.

These four probabilities can be represented in a “Confusion Matrix” shown in
Figure 11 (Fawcett, 2006). The confusion matrix is used for predictive analysis.
Typically, the probabilities appearing in the matrix are determined through test or
historical data collection.
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Figure 11: Confusion Matrix

A graphical representation of the confusion matrix probability distributions with
the threshold level of an SHM system is represented in Figure 12. In operating an
aircraft, FA rates or false calls (shaded part of the no damage distribution plot to the left
of 𝑎�𝑡ℎ ) raise concerns due to the fact that these will drive unnecessary maintenance
actions that will affect mission readiness and cost. Even beyond concerns for

unnecessary maintenance actions, false alarms could result in premature mission
terminations. Missed Detections (un-shaded part of the damage distribution plot to the
right of 𝑎�𝑡ℎ ) raise concerns due to the fact that they might cause an aircraft mishap due
to unforeseen/undetected structural problems.
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Figure 12: Graphical representation of the probabilities and Threshold detection Level
Probability of detection with degradation
A probability of detection (POD) simulation subroutine was developed to
simulate the SHM system response to a crack length occurring for every sortie following
a normal distribution. A probability of detection of the threshold crack 𝑎𝑡ℎ , detected

50% of the time, will be evaluated using Equation 13 in the following form:

𝑃𝑂𝐷(𝑎) = 0.5 = 𝛷 �

ln(𝑎�𝑡ℎ )−𝛽0 −𝛽1 ∗ln(𝑎𝑡ℎ )
𝜎

�

(15)

The signal threshold 𝑎�𝑡ℎ will be solved for and used in the following equation by (Kuhn,

2009):

𝑃𝑂𝐷(𝑎)𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑑 = 𝛷 �

ln(𝑎�𝑡ℎ)−(𝛽0 ∗𝛼)−(𝛽1 ∗𝛾)∗ln(𝑎)
𝜎∗𝜓

�

(16)

where the crack length 𝑎 from the fatigue crack growth simulation will be used and a
Monte Carlo draw will be performed every sortie. The constants 𝛽0, 𝛽1and σ are

evaluated by performing linear regression on experimental data provided by MIL58

HDBK-1823 (Department of Defense, 1999). The variables 𝑎𝑡ℎ (set equal to 10% of

𝑎𝑐𝑟 ) and 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 (set equal to 5% of 𝑎𝑐𝑟 ) are held constant for all runs, but α, γ and ψ are

varied for different simulation runs as a percentage of 𝛽0, 𝛽1and σ , respectively. While

𝑎𝑡ℎ and 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 were kept constant relative to 𝑎𝑐𝑟 for this research, previous research has
investigated the effect of varying them relative to 𝑎𝑐𝑟 (Albinali and Jacques, 2014).
The previous discussion pertains to the constant 𝑎�𝑡ℎ case. For the variable

threshold case the threshold was adjusted to maintain a 50% detection as follows:

ln(𝑎�𝑡ℎ )−(𝛽0 ∗𝛼)−(𝛽1 ∗𝛾)∗ln(𝑎)

0.5= 𝛷 �

𝜎∗𝜓

�

(17)

Using Equation 17, 𝑎�𝑡ℎ was calculated with different degradation factors to always

maintain a 50% detection threshold. Then the calculated 𝑎�𝑡ℎ was used in Equation 16.

This caused 𝑎�𝑡ℎ to be reduced, i.e. move to the left, as was described in Figure 12. For

the varying threshold case with uncertain degradation level 20% uncertainty was applied
to degradation factors α, γ and ψ in Equation 16 and the simulation was repeated to see
the effect of varying the threshold with uncertainty.
It is important to note that FA and True Detection are competing objectives, and
for a given detection system both cannot be simultaneously improved. It can be
observed from Figure 4 that false alarms are calculated from the (no damage)
distribution, and if sensor degradation occurs the distribution shifts to the left (no
damage-degradation) due to a change in the mean, or a spreading of the distribution
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occurs due to a change in standard deviation (assuming a constant threshold), resulting
in more false alarms. It also can be observed from Figure 13 the missed detection
portion of the (damage) probability distribution is the unshaded portion to the right of
𝑎�𝑡ℎ . If sensor degradation occurs the distribution shifts to the left (damaged-

degradation) due to change in the mean of the distribution (again assuming a constant
threshold detection threshold), resulting in less missed detections. For a static crack with
a>ath , a spreading of the distributions in Figure 13 without a change in the mean could

potentially result in an increase in both FA events and Missed Detections (given a static
threshold) due to greater overlap between the damage and no damage distributions.
However, when considered with cracks that transition from a<asafe to a larger value, the
POD(asafe<a<ath) distributions lie to the right of the 𝑎�𝑡ℎ line, and it will be shown that
this results in a drop in the number of Missed Detections. If a moving threshold is

considered, the threshold will need to move to the left with the mean of the POD(ath)
distribution in order to counter the effect of increased FAs. While FA probability in the
(no damage-degradation) distribution will be reduced (the intended result), the Miss
Detection probability in the (damaged-degradation) distribution will increase over the
corresponding amount that would be seen with a constant threshold.
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Figure 13: Graphical representation of the probabilities and Threshold detection
Level with Degradation

In this research, the effect of a crack growth on a legacy fighter will be simulated
for each sortie up to the time when a mishap (catastrophic failure) occurs or the end of
the design life of the aircraft is reached, whichever occurs first. For every sortie,
corresponding to a set number of load cycles, SHM system detection will be simulated
based on the current crack size and sensor performance (POD(a)) / degradation
(POD(a)Degraded). For this analysis, the SHM system will be assumed to follow an SHMlike detection trend using PZT sensors, whereby a larger crack will generate a smaller
mean signal response. An event corresponding to one of the quadrants of the confusion
matrix will occur at each sortie.
•

A true detection event will trigger an inspection and a repair action will
occur;
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•

An FA event triggering an inspection can occur. For an FA event,
subsequent NDI will identify the true crack size. In this research, NDI
performed post-flight is assumed to be perfect;

•

A Missed Detection event triggering the possibility of a mishap can
occur. A missed detection of a crack that is still less than some defined
critical length will not cause a mishap; however, missed detection of a
crack that grows to a length equal to or exceeding a critical length will
result in a mishap;

•

Finally, a true negative event triggers no action, and the aircraft is
assumed ready for the next sortie.

Varying the sensor detection POD(a)Degraded due to degradation by varying the
degradation factors where α is the degradation factor applied to the regression line
intercept β0, γ is the degradation factor applied to the regression line slope β1, ψ is the

degradation factor applied to the regression line standard deviation σ. For this research, a
single critical crack location is modeled, but the methods described herein are extensible
to multiple crack locations.
Structural health monitoring model
Modeling and simulation using MATLAB® was the method used in this
research. Figure 23 shows an event flow diagram depicting SHM related events for a
legacy aircraft equipped with SHM system.
The simulation model starts at takeoff, depicted on the bottom left side of Figure
14. To initialize the model, a threshold, 𝑎�𝑡ℎ , and safe crack length, 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 , are set and
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kept for the lifetime of the aircraft. An uncertain initial flaw size is used to initialize the
crack growth model based on the Paris model discussed previously (Paris and Erdogan,
1963). After takeoff, the model generates a probability distribution for the crack length
in that specific sortie based on the growth model and the number of accumulated flight
hours in service or since previous crack repair.

Figure 14: Flow diagram for SHM equipped aircraft
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It is shown in Figure 15 that every run has a different 𝑎0 and growth rate

(corresponding to variation in loads, ∆δ) causing the crack to propagate differently after
each replacement or repair. Also a representation of 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 , the minimum crack

considered to be significant for SHM monitoring, is shown on the figure. Detected
cracks of length smaller than 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 are not repaired. The figure also shows 𝑎𝑡ℎ , a crack
size having an associated SHM response designated as the threshold for detection, 𝑎�𝑡ℎ .
The parameters 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 and 𝑎𝑡ℎ were set at 5% and 10% of 𝑎𝑐𝑟 respectively for this

research, but earlier research explored variations of 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 and 𝑎𝑡ℎ with respect to acr

(Albinali and Jacques, 2014).
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Figure 15: Fatigue crack growth simulation results for 10 runs

At each sortie, a Monte Carlo draw is initiated simulating SHM system detection.
If the system response signal 𝑎� is greater than 𝑎�𝑡ℎ no SHM detection occurred. The

model will check if the crack length 𝑎 is greater than the critical crack length, 𝑎𝑐𝑟 . If that

is true the model will declare a catastrophic structure failure leading to an aircraft mishap.
Otherwise the aircraft will land. If no catastrophic failure occurs, the model will check if
𝑎 is greater than 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 , and if that is true a missed detection event will be recorded. Note
that while missed detections are recorded in the simulation for later analysis, the SHM
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system has no knowledge that a missed detection has occurred. If the aircraft reached its
maximum life the simulation run for this aircraft will end and a new simulation run will
start; otherwise, the model will propagate the crack length and degrade the SHM sensors
by the amount simulated for one sortie and takeoff again. For any sortie, if 𝑎� is less than

𝑎�𝑡ℎ , SHM detection occurs and the sortie will be aborted. An inspection will occur and if
𝑎 is greater than 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 , a true detection event will be recorded. The crack length will be

reset simulating a repair or a replacement of a structural component and the aircraft will
take off again. If 𝑎 is less than 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 , a FA event will be recorded, the crack 𝑎 will be
propagated, SHM sensors will be degraded, and the aircraft will take off again. If the
number of FA events reach a maximum number identified FAmax between SHM
scheduled maintenance intervals, the crack 𝑎 will be propagated, SHM sensors will be
replaced resetting the POD(a)Degraded, and the aircraft will take off again. This will

continue until the end of design life or catastrophic failure of the aircraft. For a given set
of α, γ and ψ, 100 simulation runs will be performed, each one having a randomly
selected initial flaw size and growth rate parameter. After that a different set of α, γ and ψ
will be used so trade space analysis on the affect of SHM sensor degradation and crack
length on events can be performed.
Parameter Values and Recorded Events
The main simulation routine tallies several different events for the tradespace
analysis. The number of FA events and Miss Detection events are recorded for different
sets of α, γ and ψ. For each combination of α, γ and ψ, 100 simulation runs will
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conducted and the average FA and Miss Detection events will be calculated. The results
will be displayed and discussed in the following section.
Results and Discussion
Fixed detection threshold
Figure 16 displays the effect of degradation in the intercept, slope and standard
deviation on the average number of Miss Detection events. Every point on the graph
represents one life of an aircraft simulated by 100 iterations. It is observed from Figure
16 that as the degradation factors α, γ and ψ are increased a significant drop in the
number of Miss Detection events is noticed. The greater the degradation of α, γ and ψ,
the lower the number of Miss Detection events recorded. While fewer missed detections
is a desirable outcome, this is at the expense of a significant increase in the number of
FA events. Figure 17 displays the effect of degradation in the intercept, slope and
standard deviation on the average number of FA events. Again, every point on the graph
represents one life of an aircraft simulated by 100 iterations. It is observed from Figure
17 that as the degradation factors α, γ and ψ are increased a significant increase in the
number of Miss Detection events is noticed. The greater α, γ and ψ percentage the
greater the number of FA events recorded. We notice the degradation in standard
deviation does not show a significant increase in FA events for the ranges shown;
however, Kuhn’s (2009) experimental data showed that degradation could cause up to
400% degradation in the standard deviation. This was implemented in the simulation
and showed an average of 50 FA events at 400% degradation in the standard deviation.
Confidence intervals of 95% are shown on all figures.
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Figure 16: Degradation in the Intercept, Slope and Standard Deviation vs. Average
number of Miss Detection Events

Figure 17: Degradation in the Intercept, Slope and Standard Deviation vs. Average
number of FA Events
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Figure 18 displays the effect of degradation in the intercept and standard
deviation while keeping the slope constant (non-degraded) to see the effect of combined
factors on the average number of Miss Detection events. From Figure 18 we observe
that as the degradation factors α and ψ are increased a significant drop in the number of
Miss Detection events is noticed, and combining both factors causes an even greater
decrease in the Miss Detection events. Figure 19 displays the effect of degradation in the
intercept and standard deviation while keeping the slope constant to see the effect of
combined factors on the average number of FA events. From Figure 19 we observe that
as the degradation factors α and ψ are increased a significant increase in the number of
FA events is noticed where combining both factor will cause even greater increase in the
FA events. Considering that FA events trigger unnecessary and costly maintenance
events, this increase in the FA rate would be unacceptable for fielded system.

Figure 18: Degradation in Intercept and Standard Deviation vs. Average number of Miss
Detection events
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Figure 19: Degradation in Intercept and Standard Deviation vs. Average number
of FA events

Figure 20 displays the effect of degradation in the intercept and standard
deviation while keeping the slope at a constant 30% degradation to see the effect of
combined all factors on the average number of Miss Detection events. From Figure 20
we observe that the same trend demonstrated in Figure 20 is evident, but combined
degradation of all factors results in an even greater decrease in the Miss Detection
events. The greater α and ψ percentage, the lower the number of Miss Detection events
recorded. Figure 21 displays the effect of degradation in the intercept and standard
deviation while keeping the slope also at constant 30% degradation to see the effect of
combined factors on the average number of FA events. The trend from Figure 10 is
repeated in Figure 21 but with a greater increase in FA events resulting from the
combined degradation factors.
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Figure 20: Degradation in Intercept, Standard Deviation and Slope at 30% Degradation
vs. Average number of Miss Detection events

Figure 21: Degradation in Intercept, Standard Deviation and Slope at 30% Degradation
vs. Average number of FA events
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Setting 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 to 5% of 𝑎𝑐𝑟 and 𝑎𝑡ℎ to 10% 𝑎𝑐𝑟 did not result in any simulated

catastrophic failure leading to loss of aircraft in this study. This is true for all simulated
events with varying threshold and varying degradation factors effect. Recall that a
Missed Detection event does not typically result in a catastrophic failure because the
SHM system continues to have opportunities for detection for each sortie. As long as
the crack growth rate is sufficiently slow it will typically get detected during a later
sortie. Figure 22 represents degradation in the slope effect versus average crack length
detected after a Miss Detection event. The crack detected after miss detection is
acceptably small relative to the critical crack length. Effect of setting different 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 and

𝑎𝑡ℎ values was demonstrated in a previous study (Albinali and Jacques, 2014).
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Figure 22: Degradation in the Slope vs. Average crack length after a Miss
Detection event

Varying detection threshold
Figures 23 and 24 display the effect of degradation in the intercept to observe the
effect of a variable threshold on the SHM system performance. From Figure 23 we
observe that as the degradation factor α is increased, a significant increase in the number
of FA events occurs for the constant threshold case as shown before. Varying the
threshold according to assumed degradation models serves to stem the growth of FA
events, thus avoiding the unnecessary and costly maintenance events. Even for the case
of a variable threshold, random error associated with the assumed intercept degradation
factor while the number of FA events is higher than the ideal case in which the intercept
degradation factor is known, that FA event growth is still halted at a far lower value than
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that experienced by the system with a constant threshold which continues to grow for
higher values of the intercept degradation factor.

Figure 23: Degradation in the Intercept vs. Average FA events for threshold being
constant, varying and varying with random degrading Slop factor

From Figure 24 we observe that as the intercept degradation factor α is increased
a significant drop in the number of Miss Detection events occurs for the constant
threshold case as shown previously. If the threshold is varied a relatively constant
number of Miss Detection events are recoded. This is a result of the constant drop in
mean of the regression line in Figure 13 and moving the threshold to maintain a 50%
detection level based on assumed degradation levels. If the threshold is varied but the
assumed intercept degradation factor has random error associated with it, a lower
number of Miss Detection events are recorded, but with a cost of more FA events as
discussed previously.
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Figure 24: Degradation in the Intercept vs. Average Miss Detection events for threshold
being constant, varying and varying with random degrading Slope factor

Figures 25 and 26 show the benefit of a variable detection threshold in the
presence of degradation in the slope of the POD curve. From Figure 25 we observe that
as the degradation factor γ is increased, a significant increase in the number of FA
events occurs for the constant threshold case, again as shown previously. As in the case
for the degrading intercept factor, a variable threshold serves to restrain the growth in
FA events to a manageable case, even when there is random error associated with the
assumed degradation factor.
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Figure 25: Degradation in the Slope vs. Average FA events for threshold being constant,
varying and varying with random degrading Slope factor

From Figure 26 we observe that as the degradation factor α is increased a
significant drop in the number of Miss Detection occurs for the constant threshold case,
as shown previously. With a variable threshold there is a proportional drop in the
number of Miss Detection events as the slope is degraded. This is a result of the
proportional drop in mean of the regression line in Figure 13 and moving the threshold
to maintain a 50% detection level. If the threshold is varying with random error
associated with the assumed slope degradation factor it is observed that lower
proportional Miss Detection events are recorded.

76

Figure 26: Degradation in the Slope vs. Average Miss Detection events for threshold
being constant, varying and varying with random degrading Slope factor

Figures 27 and 28 show the impact on SHM performance for the cases of known
and uncertain degradation in the standard deviation of the POD curve. In this case, no
movement in the threshold occurs because the mean of the associated distribution is
stationary. From Figure 27 we observe that the known degradation factor ψ results in a
significant increase in the number of FA events as shown before. If the standard
deviation is increased with a random degradation factor it is observed that a higher
number of FA events are recorded. The increasing spread of the POD distribution for
cracks smaller than the asafe will cause a greater proportion of that distribution to fall
below 𝑎�𝑡ℎ , resulting in more FA events. From Figure 28 we observe that as the

degradation factor ψ increases, a significant drop in the number of Miss Detection
events is recorded. To understand this trend, one needs to consider the distribution for
POD(asafe<a<ath). For a piezo-like sensor this distribution is centered on an 𝑎� > 𝑎�𝑡ℎ ,
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but the spreading of this distribution will cause a greater proportion to fall below 𝑎�𝑡ℎ .
This represents correctly detected cracks; an increase in the proportion of correctly
detected cracks (for a given crack size) can only occur if there is a complementary
reduction in Missed Detections. If the standard deviation is increased with a random
degradation factor it is observed that lower Miss Detection events are recorded. This is
due to the uncertainty in the standard deviation degradation factor. As in the prior
degradation cases, one notes that uncertainty in the standard deviation degradation
parameter adversely affects the FA rate, but has a positive effect on Missed Detections
(lower numbers).

Figure 27: Degradation in the Standard Deviation vs. Average FA events for threshold
being constant and varying
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Figure 28: Degradation in the Standard Deviation vs. Average Miss Detection events for
threshold being constant and varying

Conclusions and recommendations
Although installing an SHM system with a certain expected performance might
produce expected cost savings, better operational readiness and improved safety, the
SHM system degradation will be a concern. Any system installed on an aircraft is likely
to degrade with operation. Systems installed on aircraft typically require maintenance
and inspection schedules to ensure continued acceptable operation. The same is true for
the SHM system. This work studied the affect of degradation on SHM performance
parameters on the FA and Miss Detection events an aircraft might experience The
tradespace analysis approach described herein shows how SHM sensor degradation
factors α and γ can affect the number of FA and Missed Detections events that could
occur over the expected life of an aircraft. With increased degradation while keeping a
constant threshold a high number of false alarms will result, with a subsequent increase
79

in maintenance events and cost. On the other hand if the threshold is varied to overcome
the degradation effect, lower FA events will occur with an increase in Miss Detection
events. Further, varying the threshold with a random degradation factor lowers false
alarms but less effective that the previous case. Also, the standard deviation degradation
factor ψ can affect the number of FA and Missed Detections events that could occur
over the expected life of an aircraft. With increased degradation while keeping a
constant threshold a high number of false alarms will result, with a subsequent increase
in maintenance events and cost. Further, varying the threshold with a random
degradation factor increases false alarms but reduces Miss Detection events. With safety
of flight as a primary consideration, the SHM system sensor parameters 𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 , 𝑎�𝑡ℎ and
degradation parameters α, γ and ψ can be adjusted to reduce the probability of mishap

events to an acceptably low level while also keeping FA rates, and related maintenance
costs, at an acceptable level while mitigating the degradation effects.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Conclusions of Research
There are a number of important conclusions that arose as a result of this research
topic. The key conclusions can be summarized as follows:
•

Setting the SHM system design parameters very conservatively (closer to
safe crack levels) increases detection but causes a high number of FA
events;

•

Setting the SHM system threshold higher to tolerate a greater crack length
reduces FA events but increases the number of Miss Detection events;

•

As cracks propagate to a greater length it was observed that Miss
Detection events can lead to catastrophic failures;

•

Degradation in SHM PZT-Like sensors (POD mean) while keeping a
constant threshold will result in a high number of false alarms, with a
subsequent increase in maintenance events and cost;

•

If the threshold is varied to overcome degradation effects, lower numbers
of FA events will occur with a concurrent increase in Miss Detection
events;

•

Varying the threshold in the presence of random degradation factor lowers
false alarms as compared to the constant threshold case, but less
effectively than would be achieved with perfect knowledge of the
degradation factors;
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•

The standard deviation degradation factor can affect the number of FA and
Missed Detections events that could occur over the expected life of an
aircraft. With increased degradation a high number of false alarms will
result, with a subsequent increase in maintenance events and cost;

•

Varying the threshold in the presence of a random degradation factor
associated with the standard deviation causes a greater increase in false
alarms but a reduction in Miss Detection events is observed.

Significance of research
This research provided a life cycle analysis for a legacy aircraft equipped with
SHM system with expected events (FA, Miss Detections) that could impact the life cycle
and cost-benefit analysis. This was accomplished by combining the method used in MILHDBK-1823 and Paris’s model and integrating it into a life cycle model reflecting
changing crack size, with detection and sensor degradation in every flight sortie until the
end of the life of the aircraft. This enables users to estimate the frequency of event
occurrences and the costs associated with these events, thus contributing to a more
accurate life cycle cost (LCC) basis for an aircraft equipped with an SHM system.
This research developed a decision support model to explore the tradespace
associated with implementation of an SHM system on aging aircraft. This model was able
to capture representative crack propagation with respect to accumulated flight hours, and
it captured representative performance of SHM sensors as influenced by SHM detection
thresholds and acceptable crack lengths. The model provided the capability for system
sensor parameters to be adjusted to reduce the probability of mishap events to an
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acceptably low level while also keeping FA rates, and related maintenance costs, at an
acceptable level. This is significant for system design requirement. The model provided
the capability to capture representative changes in detection of SHM sensors due to
degradation as a result of accumulated flight hours. Representative maintenance events
(both scheduled and unscheduled) and aircraft unavailability encountered due to
structural or sensor maintenance (or replacement of the SHM system) can also be
captured from the model. This will provide a better basis for a LCC estimate as sensor
degradation and SHM system unscheduled maintenance is taken into consideration.
The model also investigated the utility and effect of employing a variable
threshold for countering the effect of degrading SHM sensors. This resulted in better
SHM performance when compared to the static threshold case (significantly lower
numbers of FA events), while maintaining levels of Miss Detection within acceptable
limits.
Recommendations for Future Research
With respect for future tasks, there are a number of tasks that could be
investigated. For this research, a single critical crack location is modeled, but the methods
described herein are extensible to multiple crack locations, and future work is
recommended to extend the model to accommodate them. Further, this method
investigated damage in metallic structures, and has not been adapted for damage
detection in composite panels where the extent of the damage is an area (compared to
crack length). In order to adapt the model for modeling damage detection in composite
structures, an analytic model for sensors capable of detecting composite damage will be
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required. As long as experimental data can show and reflect a relationship between
existing damage characteristics/severity and signal response the SHM system model
could be extended to include this type of damage detection. It is recommended that future
work extend the model to investigate damage in composite structures.
While cost drivers such as maintenance and/or repair events were captured in the
current model, a true LCC analysis was not performed. Representative cost/event data
could be used with the post processed data from the existing model to perform a costbenefit analysis associated with monitoring aircraft structural hot spots.
Finally, a longer term goal should be to consider structural health monitoring
within the larger scope of integrated system health monitoring and condition based
maintenance. This will significantly increase the scope of the model, but many of the
lower level sub-models associated with specific monitoring types/locations and/or the
maintenance and supply chain are maturing and may be available for integration into the
larger model.
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Appendix
Model Inputs and Outputs
Table 1 Lists model inputs and Table 2 List Model outputs. Some outputs like
the average unscheduled maintenance events can be used in the future once a cost and
time required by these events is available. This will allow the model to have a better
LCC estimates.
Table 1. SHM Model Inputs
Description

Value

𝑎𝑐𝑟 = critical crack length at which failure occurs
𝑎0 = initial flaw size (crack length)

4.744 mm

0.1778 mm

𝛽1 = regression line slope

1.4195

𝛽0 = regression line intercept

7.5271

𝐶 = material constant

1.5e-10

𝐾𝐼𝐶 = fracture toughness
𝑚 = material constant

53 𝑃𝑎 √𝑚
4.6

𝑁 = number of load cycles

200,000

𝜎 =standard deviation associated with probability of 𝑎� given 𝑎

0.38221

Aircraft scheduled Maintenance

1000 Hrs

Aircraft total life

8000 Hrs
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SHM system scheduled Maintenance

2000Hrs

Total Flight sorties

2000

Single sortie

4 Hrs

Table 2. SHM Model Outputs
Description

𝑎 = crack length at each sortie
Average number of catastrophic failures leading to loss of aircraft

Average number of True Detection events

Average number of False Alarm events

Average number of Miss detection events

Average number of True Negative events

Average crack length detected after a Miss Detection event

Average number of aircraft unscheduled repairs

Average number of aircraft unscheduled inspections

Average number of SHM system unscheduled repairs/sensor replacement
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The following is a conference paper titled (Integrated Health Monitoring for
Aircraft-A Literature Review and Gap Analysis) presented to the Conference on Systems
Engineering Research (CSER) 2011. It covers a detailed literature search of the
Integrated Health Monitoring research area.
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Abstract
This paper is a literature review and gap analysis for Integrated Health Monitoring
(IHM) systems focused on aircraft application. Some of the main challenges slowing the
implementation of an IHM system are technology performance, implementation issues
and a solid business case. False alarms that could be produced from this system can cause
more maintenance than needed, and the large amount of data produced from monitoring
needs improved statistical tools to clearly identify defects without false alarms. Durability
and robustness are additional technology performance issues for an IHM system. Design
of an IHM system should be part of a systems engineering framework that integrates
health monitoring and maintenance with all other requirements for the system. In the near
future an IHM system could be implemented on aging aircraft to monitor known failure
modes. Longer term, the use of an IHM system on new aircraft could result in monitoring
the full system in real time. Application of IHM to new military jets has started to appear,
but implementation in aging aircraft is lagging far behind. The presentation of a solid
business case for the IHM system is a great challenge and arguably is the main factor
contributing to the slow implementation of this technology.

Introduction
IHM for aircraft is a research area that could lead to a major change in the way we
manage the health of our fleet in the future. Relatively few IHM systems are in operation
on aircraft today. A review and a gap analysis of some of the relevant IHM literature lead
us to identify the current challenges facing the implementation of an IHM system. Some
of the main IHM system’s challenges are the technology performance, implementation
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issues and a solid business case. The presentation of a solid business case for such a
system is considered very important as this challenge has a great impact on the decision
to implement an IHM on an operational aircraft.
A perspective of the structural mechanics program of the Air Force Office of
Scientific Research on structural health monitoring (SHM) and non-destructive
evaluation (NDE) was presented by (Giurgiutiu, 2008). NDE and SHM have an essential
role in the operational readiness and safety of the Air Force fleet. Considerable
challenges face the operators and the maintainers due to aging aircrafts. NDE techniques
have proven to be reliable in detecting damage during phase inspections due to their
maturity. SHM has great potential due to its on board sensors and systems that provide
structural health assessment on demand. In particular, the study indicated a desire to use
SHM to provide remaining life prognosis and quantifying structural variability. This
study concludes that considerable applied and fundamental research is needed to develop,
integrate and implement SHM technology.

Technology Performance
Much research in the field of IHM for aircraft has been motivated by the promise
of increased performance, reduction of life cycle cost and increased availability. Yet we
still have gaps that slow the implementation of IHM systems. Many believe that the
current maturity level for IHM technology falls short of what is required for fielded
implementation. In a research on SHM by (Derriso et al., 2007) technical feasibility is
described as facing three fundamental challenges: small-scale damage must be detected
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in relatively large-scale structures, SHM systems must work in an unsupervised learning
mode, and the SHM system must be robust and reliable.

Reliability
False alarms from an IHM system can cause more maintenance action than
needed. A simulation model of a prognostics and health management (PHM) system used
as an Autonomic Logistics System (ALS) for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) was
developed and used by (Miller et al., 2007). Their simulation utilized a large number of
commonly used flight line measures of performance for aircraft availability and mission
effectiveness. Multivariate statistical analysis of these measures provided ways to analyze
the positive impact of a PHM on aircraft sortie generation. On the other hand their
analysis showed a great sensitivity to false alarms. This sensitivity implies that more
research effort should be devoted to investigating and trying to minimize false alarms
without significantly degrading detection performance.
An experiment was conducted on a fast military jet by (Read et al., 2008) to try to
test SHM in a near real-world application. A BAE Hawk jet carrying an experimental test
pod with specimens containing crack initiators was used to test flight the effect of
maneuvers on the SHM system detection capability and the possibility of detecting crack
growth during flight. The conclusion was that this system was effective in detecting a
crack and the growth of the crack during flight. They noted a very large number of
spurious noise events/signals, but were able to avoid an associated large amount of false
positive indications through the use of guard sensors surrounding the area of interest.
Test points were obtained that spanned the entire flight envelope, to include 6g turns,
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acoustic noise levels in excess of 135 decibels, and considerable electromagnetic
interference. While providing significant flight test results, a shortcoming is the fact that
the test specimen was not part of the actual aircraft structure.
Given the large amount of data produced from IHM, improved statistical tools
to clearly identify defects are necessary. A synopsis review conducted by (Sohn and Los
Alamos National Laboratory, 2004) identified a shortage of well developed tools and
algorithms for statistical pattern recognition in IHM. Many damage detection methods try
to identify damage by solving an inverse problem (predicting a condition based on a
measured response), which requires the construction of analytical models. These models
have uncertainty and need to be validated by experimental results, making this approach
less attractive for some applications. Neural network approaches can be used to map the
inverse relationship between the parameter of interest and the measured response. The
main drawback for this approach is that a large amount of data is needed for the damaged
and undamaged component and this is not always available. Statistical process control
and hypothesis testing methods can be employed without the same level of effort
developing analytical models, but these approaches tend to be limited to damage onset
detection without knowledge of the failure condition triggering the onset.

Durability and Robustness
Many studies show degradation of IHM sensors over time due to static loads,
cyclic loads, temperature and corrosion. Durability and robustness of a candidate IHM
system must be characterized prior to any implementation decision. An investigation into
the effect of cyclic loads on sensor performance was conducted by (Kuhn, 2009). In this
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research sensor degradation associated with cyclic strain was identified. Experimental
data was used to construct an analytic model of the sensor degradation. A probability of
detection (POD) degradation model was also developed to show the effect of the
degradation on the overall performance of an SHM system. In their experiment (Beard et
al., 2005) found that environmental conditions such as temperature can affect the signal
obtained from sensors. This research used calibration to compensate for temperature
variation based on the structure and application. More research is needed to characterize
fully the degradation due to environmental factors such as vibration, temperature and
corrosion.

Implementation Issues
Design of an IHM system should be part of a system engineering framework that
integrates health monitoring and maintenance with all other requirements for the aircraft.
For a new aircraft design, this would begin with the conceptual design of the system and
would affect decisions regarding operating conditions, levels of maintenance and
inspection intervals, among others. Less extensive implementations are being proposed
for aging aircraft. A framework for SHM system design was presented by (Malkin et al.,
2007) which could be applied to aging aircraft through hot spot monitoring. The initial
step in their framework, understanding the structure, involves characterization of the
materials, loads, stresses and strains, environment and interfaces. The data needed to
support an implementation decision for an SHM system can be obtained by focusing on
the following points: benefits and drawbacks of the SHM system, requirements for the
SHM system, available SHM technologies, detail design of the SHM systems, identifying
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the SHM design that meet the requirements and the cost of the SHM system that meet the
requirements. Although this framework was developed for hot spot monitoring it could
be modified for other applications as mentioned by the study.
A research by (Millar, 2007) identifies barriers that have slowed acceptance
and use of prognostics health management tools in military propulsion systems over the
past two decades. In particular, they note incomplete total life cycle systems engineering
management (TLCSM) as a barrier to implementation. The US Department of Defence
Acuisition Guidebook states in Section 4.1.3 TLCSM in Systems Engineering: “It is
fundamental to systems engineering to take a total life cycle, total systems approach to
system planning, development, and implementation.” It is also important to implement
TLCSM not only on new systems but also on legacy systems currently operating to
control the high maintenance cost as the systems continue to operate beyond their design
life. This research describes up and down periods of development associated with engine
condition monitoring. The up periods are triggered by the cost benefits that could be
gained by successful monitoring, and the down periods occur when technology is not
available for the monitoring system. This study concludes that the use of TLCSM through
the systems engineering process is the right tool to close the gaps that are holding up
large scale applications and implementation of IHM.
Advanced Integrated Vehicle Health Monitoring systems (IVHM) are
expected to formulate a response based on the extent of the damage. This is contrasted
with pure monitoring systems that only report damage (Price et al., 2003). This study
sub-divided the problem as follows:
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•

Detection of damage. Requires knowledge of the environment and

anticipated damage modes;
•

Development of sensors will depend on the time required for the system

to respond;
•

Characterization of damage. This may be accomplished during detection

of damage or may require additional and/or different sensors;
•

Prioritization of the seriousness of damage. Damage that can

compromise the mission of the vehicle will obviously be given greater
urgency;
•

Identification of the cause of the damage. This may require an intelligent

system populated by large numbers of sensors providing information on the
vehicle as a whole;
•

Formulation of a response. This could be an individual or sequence of

actions, to include panic responses where appropriate;
•

Execution of a response. This could involve reconfiguration of the

vehicle or restriction of operating conditions.
The integration process associated with both aging and new aircraft is considered
a major weakness in the implementation of IHM. In the near future an IHM system could
be integrated on aging aircraft to monitor known failure modes. Aging aircraft face a
challenge on how to integrate an IHM system with conditional based maintenance (CBM)
because design choices will be limited by the existing system architecture. A number of
integration issues were researched by (Buderath, 2004) and concluded the following.
There should be a clear process for integration to ensure the right selection of an IHM
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system, data analysis, and sensor location. Integration should be addressed to reach
acceptance on all system levels. An integrated process is needed during the development
phase of an IHM system to be able to fully integrate with CBM to meet safety concerns
and reduce the costs associated with maintenance and repair actions.

Business Case
The presentation of a solid business case for the IHM system is a great challenge
and arguably is the main factor contributing to the slow implementation of this
technology. Factors that could help create a business case are the understanding of the
customer needs and requirements and performing a credible cost and risk analysis (Perez
et al., 2010).
Quantifying cost reduction in the total life cycle of a system through use of IHM
needs to be presented. Few research attempts to quantify the cost benefit of IHM are
found in literature, and wide discrepancies can be noted in the cost savings estimates. In
one study it is estimated that implementation of SHM on a commercial transport aircraft
could result in a 30% to 40% reduction in maintenance requirements. This would result in
a recovery of the initial implementation costs in only two to three years (Kent et al.,
2000). Another research study (Schmidt et al., 2004) showed only a one percent
reduction of the maintenance costs by using SHM systems on an AIRBUS aircraft;
however, the authors noted the omission of consideration for increased availability due to
reduced inspection times. Another finding of this study was a reduced fuselage panel
weight by up to 15 percent using SHM. This impacts cost in many ways such as lower
fuel consumption and longer operation range. Research on aging military aircraft showed
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cost benefits of using an SHM on some hot spots of the structure of a tornado fighter, but
suggests the implementation should be limited to hot spots where real payoff can be
identified (Boller, 2001).
A unique cost-benefit analysis for the allocation and cost justification of an
Integrated System Health Management (ISHM) at the conceptual design level was
presented by (Hoyle et al., Mehr, 2007). An optimization framework was used to
determine the optimal allocation of ISHM to maximize profit. This was calculated using a
profit function formulated using single attribute objectives as the product of system
availability and revenue per unit availability minus the summation of costs associated
with detection and risk. This framework also addressed the optimal detection/false alarm
threshold and inspection interval, assuming the availability of parameters characterizing
the sensor in terms of detection, false alarm rate and failure rate. When this framework
was applied to an aerospace system it was shown that applying ISHM increased profit by
11%, reduced cost by a factor of 2.4 and increased the inspection intervals by a factor of
1.5. A useful extension of this work would involve modification and application for
systems not driven by revenue generation, such as military aircraft, which can still benefit
by reduction in the total life cycle cost (LCC).
The number of sensors needs to be optimized to provide desired effectiveness
within cost and weight constraints. A balance between detection sensitivity, false alarms
and the number of sensors needs to be achieved. Many models are developed in the
general area of structural monitoring. For example a Reliability-Based System
Assessment was used by (Hosser et al., 2004) for monitoring buildings structures with
sensors. This computer code consists of a data base module, a computational module and
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a statistical module for the optimization of the assessment cycle. Another promising area
for optimization is the use of genetic algorithms, which can be used for discrete value
and/or non-convex solution spaces to determine the optimal number and location of
sensors for damage locations (Boller, 2000).
Another approach to quantify cost benefit was used by (Kapoor et al., 2008) using
optimization and simulation of a maintenance phase with SHM technology applied to
commercial aircraft. The effect of using SHM technologies to reduce maintenance
downtime was presented. The concept of this approach was to identify the critical paths
along the maintenance process. After a critical maintenance path was identified it was
modified with an SHM alternative approach. After optimization and simulation a
reduction factor of 6 for a critical path task was achieved, resulting in an increase of 100
hrs of aircraft availability over the life cycle. This study indicates that cost benefit
analysis for SHM should involve consideration of defined maintenance phases
scheduling.
Standardization of IHM systems across different platforms should help in
reducing the ownership cost as well. In the automobile industry IHM has seen wider
application than in the aircraft industry, as evidenced by systems like General Motor’s
On-Star (You et al., 2005). These authors investigated remote diagnostics and
maintenance systems and identified the cost reduction associated with standardization
across different automobile models.
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Conclusion
IHM systems face many obstacles and gaps that have resulted in the slow
implementation in real-world applications. These obstacles include technology
performance, implementation issues and a solid business case that justifies the investment
in an IHM system.
A major technology performance issue is the reliability of an IHM system. False
alarms that could be produced from this system can cause more maintenance than needed.
More research should be devoted to investigating and trying to minimize false alarms
without significantly degrading detection performance. The large amount of data
produced from monitoring needs improved statistical tools to clearly identify defects.
Current tools such as Numerical Modeling, Neural Networks and Analysis Hypotheses
are available but have their disadvantages. Durability and robustness are additional
technology performance issues for an IHM system. Many studies show degradation of
IHM sensors over time due to static loads, cyclic loads, temperature and corrosion.
Design of an IHM system should utilize a Systems Engineering framework that
integrates health monitoring and maintenance with all other requirements for the system.
For a new aircraft design, this would begin with the conceptual design of the system and
would affect decisions regarding levels of maintenance and inspection intervals, among
others. Less extensive implementations are likely appropriate for aging aircraft. In the
near future an IHM system could be implemented on aging aircraft to monitor known
failure modes. Aging aircraft face a challenge on how to implement an IHM system for
conditional based maintenance (CBM) because design choices will be limited by the
existing system architecture. More research must be done before full integration of an
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IHM system into CBM can be achieved. Longer term, the use of an IHM system on new
aircraft could result in monitoring the full system in real time.
The presentation of a solid business case for the IHM system is a great challenge
and arguably is the main factor contributing to the slow implementation of this
technology. Approaches and models to quantify the reduction in life cycle cost by using
these systems is an important field of study. The number of sensors needs to be optimized
to provide desired effectiveness within cost and weight constraints. Further, the health
monitoring throughout the aircraft must be extensive enough to result in a lengthening of
scheduled inspection intervals if it is to provide maintenance cost savings.
Standardization of IHM systems across different platforms should help in reducing the
ownership cost as well. The literature indicates that adoption of IHM in the commercial
world is further along than in the military due to more aggressive cost saving measures.
Application of IHM to new military jets has started to appear, but implementation in
aging aircraft is lagging far behind. A solid business case for the aging military aircraft
remains as an open area of investigation.
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